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2 introduction and summary
According to Robbins (1932), “[e]conomics is a science which studies humanbehaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have al-
ternative uses.” Since the beginning of the 20th century, with the formalization of
rational choice theory (see Hicks and Allen 1934; Houthakker 1950; Samuelson 1947;
Pareto 1906), economists have predominantly studied human behavior theoretically
using an axiomatic approach. Moreover, they have often adopted a highly simplified
notion of narrow self-interest, which is now referred to as the standard economic
model. However, with the advent of behavioral economics in the late 20th century, the
focus has shifted to an evidence-based understanding of behavior, using the standard
economic model only as a benchmark (Thaler 2016). Along with limits to rationality
and self-control, bounded self-interest is one of the key behavioral regularities found
in this literature that depicts a more psychologically realistic picture of a representative
agent (Mullainathan and Thaler 2000).
This thesis contributes to research that challenges the narrow self-interest assump-
tion used in the standard economic model. The first part of the thesis comprises
three experimental studies on other-regarding behavior. The second part of the paper
includes three studies that fit into the literature on private provision of public goods.
In the following, I will briefly introduce both parts of the thesis. The main goal is
to highlight the unifying features of the studies and place them within the relevant
literature. Within the sections describing the two parts, I will also briefly summarize
each study, again with a focus on the overarching themes.
Part I
Decades of experimental research with public goods, ultimatum, trust, and dictator
games have shown that individuals forgo monetary payoff to the benefit of others,
even in anonymous one-shot decisions, ruling out possible explanations based on a
self-interested strategy (for reviews see e.g. Johnson and Mislin 2011; Chaudhuri 2011;
Güth and Kocher 2014; Kagel and Roth 2016). The outcome-based preference models
of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) represent initial attempts
to synthesize these findings and integrate them into formal economic theory. While
these models have been able to explain most experimental findings using standard
games up to this point, their simplicity means that other fairness considerations either
cannot be accounted for or at least are not explicitly modeled. However, as noted by
Kagel and Roth (2016), the two models have inspired new experiments designed to
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capture that other-regarding behavior depends not only on the distribution of payoffs,
but also on the process that leads to up to it. Process-related features include the
intention of the involved decision-makers (e.g. Charness and Rabin 2002; Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger 2004; Falk et al. 2008) and relatedly, the degree to which responsibility
can be causally attribute to them (e.g. Coffman 2011; Falk et al. 2020; Hamman et al.
2010), the fairness of procedures (e.g. Bolton et al. 2005), or the adherence to specific
social or moral norms such as telling the truth (e.g. Gneezy 2005; Gneezy et al. 2018;
Abeler et al. 2019).
All three studies in the first part of this thesis examine behavior in situations
where the decision-maker’s choice is probably influenced by its consequences on
the distribution of outcomes, but where other determinants are also likely to play
a role. In the first study, we examine consumers’ purchase decisions in response to
price discounts for low income groups. Regarding the fairness of outcomes, price
discrimination may be accepted as long as it redistributes outcomes in a manner that
is consistent with what consumers perceive as fair. However, this ignores important
procedural features that may also affect consumer acceptance of price discrimination.
These include reciprocity concerns regarding the seller (e.g. Fehr and Gächter 2000),
a dislike of unequal price treatment (e.g. Xia et al. 2004), and a lack of agency in the
price-setting process (e.g. Alexopoulos et al. 2013; Choshen-Hillel and Yaniv 2011). The
second study examines how different excuses emanating from uncertainty regarding the
consequences of one’s actions on others influence selfish behavior. Previous research
has shown that individuals do not necessarily have preferences for a fair distribution
of outcomes, but merely want to appear fair (e.g. Dana et al. 2007). Uncertainty blurs
the causal responsibility for harm suffered by others and allows individuals to avoid
the assignment of blame and responsibility by themselves or others (e.g. Bartling
and Fischbacher 2012; Coffman 2011). The third study deals with dishonesty. While
refraining from lying can also be explained by distributional preferences (Gneezy
2005), a recent meta-analysis concludes that a “preference for being seen as honest
and a preference for being honest are the main motivations for truth-telling.” (Abeler
et al. 2019) That is, similar to study two, individuals are driven in part by how they
are perceived by others. We test whether this preference to appear honest is sustained
in an online setting where social identity concerns and reputational concerns are likely
to be reduced.
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Consumer behavior under benevolent price discrimination
In outlining their model of inequity aversion, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) note that they
consider the egalitarian outcome to be the natural reference point of social comparison
in their model because “subjects enter the laboratory as equals, they do not know
anything about each other, and they are allocated to different roles in the experiment
at random.” That is, in the specific context of standard laboratory experiments, the
distribution of outcomes that subjects consider as “fair” is determined by equality. In
a different context, however, this need not be the case. According to equity theory
in social psychology (Festinger 1954; Adams 1963), a distribution is perceived as fair
if outcomes are proportional to individuals’ input. That is, subjects follow a merit-
based conception of fairness. When roles and income are randomly assigned, as in
standard economic experiments, inputs do not differ and thus the egalitarian outcome
constitutes the reference point. In contrast, when individuals must earn their income,
the fair share is proportional to the individual’s effort or performance. Indeed, results
from ultimatum (Hoffman and Spitzer 1985; Hoffman et al. 1996), double auction
(Ball et al. 2001) and public good games (Clark 1998) show that behavior depends on
whether initial endowments are assigned randomly or based on past performance.
Merit-based notions of justice have also been used to explain cross-country differences
in preferences for redistribution that result from different beliefs about equality of
opportunity in a society (Alesina and Angeletos 2005; Krawczyk 2010; Durante et al.
2014).
In this study, we examine whether merit-based distributional preferences can also
explain the acceptance of price discounts for certain low-income groups of the pop-
ulation, such as students and the elderly. When income inequality is not rooted in
merit, such price discrimination leads to an equalization of outcomes that may be
closer to what individuals perceive as fair. Although the application of merit-based
equity preferences in the context of price discrimination is theoretically appealing,
previous research using this theory to explain higher fairness perceptions of discounts
for low-income groups (Wu et al. 2012) or incorporating this link into mathematical
models via utility functions (Rotemberg 2011) relies on an assumption that has not
yet been empirically tested. Alternative explanations for the prevalence of certain
price discounts can therefore not be ruled out. For example, acceptance of lower
prices for the elderly might instead be driven by habituation, learned societal norms or
compensation for other types of inequality such as quality of life. Moreover, the results
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of studies on redistributive preferences do not readily translate to the context of price
discrimination in consumer markets. Most importantly, this literature abstracts from
many process-related variables to focus on outcome distributions. This excludes many
elements of the price-setting mechanism that might well interact with or mediate
distributive preferences and their translation into behavior. For example, under price
discrimination, redistribution is not actively chosen by consumers, but imposed by
sellers. Reciprocity considerations thus become relevant (Fehr and Gächter 2000) and
moral responsibility for bringing about a fair outcome is shifted away from consumers
(Pizarro et al. 2003; Bandura 2002). At best, consumers can attribute to themselves
a moral responsibility for influencing future prices and thus outcomes (Pigors and
Rockenbach 2016).
We measure consumers’ response to price discounts that benefit financially disadvan-
taged individuals, leading to a convergence of outcomes. Using consumers’ purchase
decisions and (costly) switching behavior to or away from a price discriminating store,
we can quantify preferences both against and for price discrimination. To investigate
whether consumer behavior is consistent with merit-based distributional preferences,
we implement experimental variations of intentions, reciprocity, transparency, merited
vs. unmerited income inequality, consumer agency through a market mechanism and
transaction costs.
Our study provides insights into how sellers can differentiate prices in the market.
These include a wider range of potential recipients of discounts, poaching prices,
improved assessments of meaningful degrees of strategic price obfuscation and trans-
parency, or the promotion of certain pricing strategies as part of corporate social
responsibility communications.
Excusing selfish behavior with (willfully induced) uncertainty: An experimental study
While early models of fairness explain other-regarding behavior by a preference for
equitable or fair outcomes, more recent economic studies propose that individuals do
not want to be fair, but merely want to appear fair (e.g. Dana et al. 2007). In situations
where the relationship between their actions and outcomes is clear, individuals are
constrained by their desire to appear fair. In contrast, when this relationship is
blurred by uncertainty, individuals are able to behave selfishly while maintaining
the appearance of fairness and avoiding the assignment of blame and responsibility
by themselves or others (e.g. Bartling and Fischbacher 2012; Coffman 2011). In
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other words, moral norms act as constraints on selfish preferences rather than being
preferences themselves (Konow 2000; Bolton et al. 1998). Uncertainty introduces
“moral wiggle room” that allows individuals to relax these constraints (Dana et al.
2007). Uncertainty can arise from e.g. delegation of tasks to agents (e.g. Hamman et al.
2010), responsibility diffusion when outcomes depend on the interaction of multiple
individuals (e.g. Falk et al. 2020) or willful ignorance (e.g. Bartling et al. 2014).
This study contributes to the above literature by examining the interplay of different
excuses for selfish behavior associated with uncertainty. Our study is closely related
to economic experiments in which unanimous group decisions are required to either
cause or prevent an externality (e.g. Brütt et al. 2020; Falk et al. 2020; Irlenbusch
and Saxler 2019; Behnk et al. 2017). In the first case, a single fair vote prevents the
externality with certainty. Therefore, each individual can excuse a selfish vote on the
grounds that there is a chance that the externality will be prevented by a fair vote of
another group member (bystander excuse). In the second case (i.e. unanimity to prevent
the externality) individuals cause an externality with certainty, but they can use the
excuse “if I am not selfish, someone else probably will be” to justify their behavior
(replacement excuse; Falk et al. 2020; Ziegler et al. 2021). In both cases, the perception
of being pivotal, i.e. by how much the probability of the externality is affected by an
individual’s decision, depends on an individual’s belief about the behavior of other
group members.
In our study, we replace uncertainty due to the behavior of other decision-makers by
moves of nature. This allows us to manipulate uncertainty precisely, while holding con-
stant other dimensions of responsibility diffusion such as shared guilt (Rothenhäusler
et al. 2018) or information on social norms. We further contribute to the literature by
considering different combinations of excuses and different degrees of being pivotal.
We also test excuse-driven behavior by restricting the scope of uncertainty so that
subjects can always prevent part of the externality and therefore never justify that the
ex-post outcome will be the same independent of their behavior. Finally, we examine
whether decisions are sensitive to the possibility to ignore consequences for third
parties.
Understanding exactly how excuse-driven behavior works in decisions that involve
tradeoffs between self and others has far-reaching policy implications, particularly
for markets. Although each individual market transaction may lead to comparatively
small harmful effects, the ubiquity of markets, combined with extensive division of
labor can lead to a wide diffusion of responsibility and increased opportunities for
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willful ignorance, allowing for moral disengagement on both sides of the market and
substantial aggregate effects. Our study can provide insight into whether measures
that reduce (perceived) uncertainty and resulting excuses could be used as policy
instruments to promote ethical purchasing behavior. Furthermore, our study has
implications for the success of policies aimed at increasing transparency about the
consequences of consumption decisions.
Dishonest online: A distinction between observable and unobservable lying
Standard economic models make clear predictions regarding dishonesty when infor-
mation is private: Individuals will report what maximizes their profits and place no
intrinsic value on telling the truth. People’s honesty has far-reaching consequences
because most economic interactions are characterized by asymmetric information.
Examples include tax evasion (Allingham and Sandmo 1972), the used car market
(Akerlof 1970), expert advice (Crawford and Sobel 1982), and dishonesty of entire
economic sectors such as the Libor manipulation (Abrantes-Metz et al. 2012). How-
ever, recent economic experiments also show that individuals do not maximally lie
about private information (see e.g. Gneezy 2005; Mazar et al. 2008; Abeler et al. 2019;
Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi 2013). One possible explanation for this finding is
that individuals care about the outcomes of others (either other participants or the
experimenter) and therefore choose their extent of lying to achieve their desired distri-
bution of payoffs. However, Gneezy (2005), in his early work on deception, suggests
that distributive preferences are probably not the only explanation for the observed
behavior. Indeed, Abeler et al. (2019) conclude in their recent meta-analysis that a
“preference for being seen as honest and a preference for being honest are the main
motivations for truth-telling.”
Our study builds on the finding that individuals have a preference for being seen as
honest, i.e., people are concerned about their social image or reputation. This motive
has recently been studied theoretically and experimentally by Abeler et al. (2019),
Gneezy et al. (2018), and Khalmetski and Sliwka (2019). All three studies show that
lying behavior appears to be motivated in part by concern for social image. Building
on this finding, we are interested in whether this result can be replicated in an online
setting, where subjects are likely to have less concern about their social image or
reputation.
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Our experiment is conducted on the crowdsourcing platform “MTurk”. Due to
the absence of a physically present experimenter, social identity concerns could be
reduced. In addition, due to the flexibility and short-term nature of work arrangements
in online labor markets (see Dube et al. 2020), reputational concerns might also be
reduced. To study the role of social image on dishonesty, we focus on the effect of
the observability of a lie. While subjects can be individually identified as liars for
observable outcomes, this is not the case for unobservable outcomes. Instead, lies can
only be identified at the group level, based on known prior probabilities of the possible
outcomes. If individuals have a “pure” preference for truth-telling, the observability
of a lie should not matter. If, however, individuals also have a preference for being
seen as honest, we expect more lying on unobservable outcomes.
The study of dishonesty in online settings is important because economic interactions
are increasingly characterized by (1) reduced physical interaction and (2) a greater
number of potential trading partners due to technological advances. More recently,
the ongoing digitization of economic transactions has been catalyzed by the COVID-19
pandemic.
Part II
One of the first types of experiments used to study the self-interest assumption were
public good games. These games create a social dilemma because the marginal utility
of an individual contributing to the public good is negative, while the effect on social
welfare is positive. Under the narrow self-interest assumption, no one contributes
to the public good. The failure of markets to provide an efficient level of public
goods is therefore seen as one of the main reasons for governmental intervention.
However, decades of research in behavioral economics show that private contributions
are generally higher than predicted by narrow self-interest and that a decay in contri-
butions over repeated games can be prevented by means of either costly punishment
of free-riders (e.g. Fehr and Gächter 2000; Fehr and Gächter 2002; Gürerk et al. 2006)
or non-monetary mechanisms such as moral suasion (e.g. Rege and Telle 2004; Masclet
et al. 2003; Bochet and Putterman 2009) or assortative matching (e.g. Page et al. 2005;
Gächter and Thöni 2005).
In addition to these ideal-type laboratory studies, scholars have also been interested
in understanding the underlying preferences for private contributions to public goods
in real-world settings. This research has scrutinized a range of motives to contribute
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that go beyond narrow self-interest, but has also led to potential explanations that fall
within the boundaries of self-interest, such as a short-term positive marginal utility
(Lakhani and von Hippel 2003) or long-term signaling incentives. Lerner and Tirole
(2002), e.g. , posit several motives for open source software development, such as
the career concern and ego gratification incentive. The literature since has largely
supported their hypotheses (Bitzer and Schröder 2005; Xu et al. 2020; Mustonen
2005). Another prominent example of a digital public good that is privately provided
is Wikipedia. Here, scholars have particularly focused on social benefits (Aaltonen
and Seiler 2016; Zhang and Zhu 2011) and intrinsic motivation (Xu and Li 2015;
Yang and Lai 2010) as an incentive to contribute. It is important to note that in the
above examples, there is a positive marginal utility from private contributions, unlike
standard public good games. However, the existence of positive externalities still
leads to a sub-optimal provision of the public good. A better understanding of the
underlying motives can help refine standard models of public goods and enable the
development of policies that are more likely to lead to the desired behavioral changes
and more cost-effective than alternative policy instruments. The second part of this
thesis can be placed in said literature.
Study four is an experimental study of the influence of gamification on effort
provision in a real-effort task that mimics important characteristics of micro-tasks
typically found in crowd-sourcing projects. Crowdsourcing is increasingly used
to generate public knowledge, and the use of gamification can increase intrinsic
motivation and thus private contributions to the public good. Studies five and six both
explore digital public goods in the context of the EU chemical regulation REACH1,
evaluate how effectively the public good is provided and discuss possible adjustments
to increase the incentives for individuals that freely contribute to the good.
Can gamification lead to increased output from paid crowdworkers?
Recently, advances in information and communications technology have enabled new
forms of knowledge generation by larger, dynamically formed groups of individuals
(Estellés-Arolas and González-Ladrón-de-Guevara 2012). This approach, referred to
as crowdsourcing, is often used for tasks that are easy for humans but difficult for
algorithms to solve, such as classifying text documents and images (Nakatsu et al.
1REACH concerns the registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals and estab-
lished the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA). See Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European
Parliament and of the Council, OJ 2006 L 396/1.
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2014). Compared to the more complex tasks in software development or in the case of
Wikipedia contributions, micro-tasks in crowdsourcing projects are often repetitive
and therefore neither inherently enjoyable nor do they provide signaling incentives
to contributors. Therefore, providers are increasingly using gamification, “the use of
game design elements in non-game contexts”, to motivate contributions (Deterding
et al. 2011; Morschheuser et al. 2017; Cooper et al. 2010).
In this study we experimentally study the effect of different gamification elements
(progress bars, badges and leaderboards) on effort provision and task enjoyment in a
real-effort task using a between-subject design. We contribute to an emerging literature
on the influence of gamification in crowdsourcing, with a focus on micro-tasks. To
mimic such tasks, we use a variation of the slider task by Gill and Prowse (2012).
We pay subjects for a fixed number of completed tasks, but allow more tasks to be
completed. We compare the number of completed tasks for the different gamified
versions of the tasks with a control treatment without gamification. Moreover, we
look at treatment differences in autonomous motivation, which we elicit in the post-
experimental questionnaire using a modified version of the measure by Ryan and
Connell (1989).
Crowdsourcing is increasingly used in the generation of public knowledge. Ex-
amples of citizen involvement in scientific research include protein folding (Cooper
et al. 2010), classification of galaxies (Raddick et al. 2013) or animal sounds (Franzoni
and Sauermann 2014). Outside of research, crowdsourcing is also used to provide
evidence to influence policy decisions or to inform legal processes (Kullenberg and
Kasperowski 2016). In this regard, crowdsourcing has the potential to lead to a de-
mocratization of regulatory capacity (Grabosky 2013). First examples of technology
enabled quality assurance by citizen are e.g. the crowd-sensing of radiation levels near
the Fukushima nuclear accident site to supplement governmental data, websites where
patients report effects of medication to supplement to clinical trials (Weil et al. 2013)
or crowd-sourced reviews of governmental documents for questionable claims (The
Guardian 2009). Grabosky (2013) calls this increased citizen involvement in regula-
tory activity “wiki-regulation”. Gamifying public crowd-sourcing tasks potentially
increases crowdworkers’ task motivation, engagement and enjoyment. This, in turn,
can lead to a higher willingness to contribute, higher quality of work and long-term
engagement.
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Breathing life into consumer rights: smartphone tools facilitating the “right to know” on
substances of very high concern in REACH articles
The generation of information about the toxicological properties of and exposure
to chemicals is not an end in itself. Ultimately, its purpose is to inform the risk-
management decisions of different societal actors. Public access to information is
an important objective of REACH and Art. 33(2) gives consumers a “right to know”
about toxic substances in articles. It provides the public with firm and product
specific information and, therefore, has the potential to create market-based incentives
for firms to reduce toxic substances. In the words of the European Commission,
the “right to know” was included so “[c]onsumers can play an active role [. . . ] by
taking an interest in the safety of the products they buy”2. However, the provision’s
operationalisation, most notably article suppliers’ response window of 45 days, does
not support consumers to make immediate informed decisions—at the point of sale
in particular (see reviews of empirical research on the effectiveness of information
disclosure policies by Weil et al. 2006; Dranove and Jin 2010). Moreover, information
provided by firms in response to requests by individual consumers is, a priori, not
publicly available.
In an attempt to remove the limitations of Art. 33(2) REACH, the German NGO
“Friends of the Earth Germany” (BUND) updated its smartphone application “ToxFox”
in October 2016, to allow users to send “right to know” requests after having scanned
a product’s barcode. Moreover, firms can voluntarily provide information to the
database—a process that is called “unraveling” in the disclosure literature (Dranove
and Jin 2010; Board 2009). Hence, information is not only crowdsourced through
consumers. Information provided by suppliers (whether by email or through the
database) is stored and thereafter immediately available. Thereby, the information is
made public and waiting time is essentially reduced from the legal time limit of 45
days to less than a second.
We assess the impact of ToxFox in terms of the quantity of Art. 33(2) requests and
publicly available information in the database. Moreover, we identify motivational,
regulatory, legal and technical barriers to an increased use of ToxFox to send requests.
Based on these barriers, we derive recommendations regarding (1) governance (in-
cluding enforcement and implementation), (2) smartphone applications and (3) future
research, all ultimately aimed at increasing user contributions to the public database.
2http://ec.europa.eu/environment/chemicals/reach/right_en.htm
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Refining tools to bridge the gap between academia and chemical regulation: perspectives for
WikiREACH
To save resources, enforcement authorities often rely on firms to self-report information
(Kaplow and Shavell 1994). This is also true for REACH. Indeed, REACH has been
lauded for shifting the informational burden from regulators to firms (Führ and Bizer
2007; Silbergeld et al. 2015). However, if firms fear regulation or bad publicity, they
have an incentive to withhold damaging information (Coria 2018) or to not report
information truthfully (Jacob and Levitt 2003; Andreoni et al. 1998). Evaluation of
registration dossiers (ECHA 2016; EC 2018) and information provided on SVHC in
articles (Wursthorn 2018; KEMI 2016; SHRG 2013) revealed a low quality of self-reports
by firms under REACH. According to the executive director of ECHA this “raises
questions on the incentives (or lack of them) for complying with obligations [. . . ].”
(Buxton 2018). To counter-balance these incentives, a system of quality assurance
has to be put in place. Traditionally, this is done by raising and properly enforcing
sanctions (Kaplow and Shavell 1994; Shimshack and Ward 2005).
We propose a complementary quality assurance mechanism, whereby information
on the effects of chemicals generated by academic research serves as a quality check
for industry studies. However, screening the literature for appropriate studies and
extracting data is burdensome. Therefore, the burden on regulators can be reduced by
making data easily and readily accessible. We study WikiPharma3, a database that
aggregates ecotoxicity data for pharmaceuticals extracted from peer-reviewed studies.
The use of the WikiPharma database is explored to develop strategies on a similar tool
in the context of REACH.
The main challenge of tools like WikiPharma is that they require constant updating
as soon as new choice-relevant information becomes available. Therefore the wiki-
function was added to crowdsource new data from academic researchers. However,
researchers need to be rewarded within the academic system (in terms of career, income
and internal recognition) to have incentives to provide information to the envisioned
WikiREACH (Stephan 1996). Such incentives may arise if WikiREACH, similar to
academic networking websites, increases the discoverability of research (Niyazov et al.
2016), emerges as a alternative measure of scholarly impact (Haustein et al. 2014) or
funding agencies reward communication of results outside of academia (Franzoni et al.
2011). To ensure that such a tool is continuously maintained and compatible with the
3http://www.wikipharma.org/welcome.asp
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regulatory system, and thereby useful for hazard and risk assessments of chemicals, it
would benefit from being developed in collaboration with the major stakeholders in
the field, i.e. regulatory agencies, academia, industry, scientific journals, and providers
of research network platforms.
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Alexander Erlei, Mattheus Brenig, and Nils Engelbrecht
Extensive research shows that consumers are generally averse to price discrimination.
However, instruments of differential pricing can benefit consumer surplus and alleviate
inequity through targeted price discounts. This paper examines whether and how these
outcome considerations influence consumer reactions to price discrimination. The
authors introduce the concept of benevolent price discrimination (BPD) as a downward-
bound instrument that always benefits financially disadvantaged groups or individuals,
thereby leading to a convergence of outcomes. Five experiments with 3415 participants
show that a large share of consumers is willing to costly switch away from a store
that offers a discount to low-income consumers. This happens irrespective of whether
income differences are due to luck or merit. While the price-discriminating store does
attract some new high-income consumers, it cannot compensate the loss of existing
consumers. Simulating market transactions by endowing consumers with agency over
future prices increases costly support for BPD. These results contrast previous findings
on social preferences and inequity aversion, highlighting the importance of context
and procedure for economic bargaining. Strong behavioral constraints persist even
when price discrimination reduces unmerited income differences and no consumer
experiences price increases.
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1 Introduction
Technological progress, especially the advent of big data, has reduced the technological
and informational constraints on sellers to differentiate prices among consumers.
Despite these developments, sellers still hesitate to deviate from uniform pricing
strategies (Fudenberg and Villas-Boas 2012). One commonly evoked explanation is
that sellers anticipate the risk of antagonizing consumers (Fabiani et al. 2006), as
exemplified by research showing that differential price strategies are often at odds
with consumers’ fairness perceptions (see e.g. Xia et al. 2004; Haws and Bearden 2006),
which translates into shopping intentions (Bolton et al. 2010), purchase satisfaction
(Shor and Oliver 2006), intentions to spread negative word-of-mouth (Ferguson et al.
2014) and consumption choices (Leibbrandt 2020). Thus, in addition to technological
constraints, profit-seeking through demand-based price discrimination may also be
inhibited by negative consumer reactions, i.e., “behavioral constraints” (Kahneman
et al. 1986).
However, consumers do not appear to be universally averse to demand-based price
discrimination. Most prominently, price discounts for specific groups of the population,
like students and the elderly, are common in many countries. One explanation for
this ostensible contradiction is that consumers accept price discrimination if it benefits
lower income groups, thereby leading to an equalization of economic outcomes
(Rotemberg 2011; Wu et al. 2012). Whilst theoretically appealing, this assertion has
thus far not been empirically verified. Existing behavioral research primarily focuses
on processes, without direct control or transparency over the realized distribution of
economic outcomes between consumers. Alternative explanations for the prevalence
of certain price discounts can therefore not be ruled out. Regarding e.g. the elderly,
the acceptance of lower prices may instead be driven by habituation, learned societal
norms, or compensation for other kinds of inequality like quality of living. If consumer
reactions to price discrimination do, however, depend on the concurrent equalization
of consumer outcomes, this insight could open up new possibilities for sellers to
implement and market tools of differential price setting. This includes a broader range
of potential price discount recipients, poaching prices, improved judgments regarding
useful degrees of strategic price obfuscation and transparency, or promoting certain
pricing strategies as part of corporate social responsibility communications.
This paper experimentally addresses whether and how consumer reactions depend
on the effect of interpersonal price discrimination on the overall distribution of con-
introduction 25
sumer welfare. In particular, we introduce the concept of benevolent price discrimination
(BPD). We define BPD as a policy of differential pricing that is downward-bound and
always benefits financially disadvantaged groups or individuals, thereby leading to a
convergence of outcomes. Whilst a seller can decrease prices for certain individuals
or groups, they cannot increase prices for anyone. Thus, nobody is worse off as a
consequence of price-discrimination. Consumers without access to the lower price
experience relatively disadvantageous, rather than disadvantageous price discrimination.
Most importantly, BPD always leads to a more equal outcome distribution. We thus
quantify behavioral constraints towards price discrimination when implemented as
a mechanism that increases joint overall welfare while creating a more equitable
distribution of economic gains.
1.1 Procedural and distributive price fairness
The price fairness literature has long recognized the importance of outcome-related
reasoning, identifying two distinct main criteria that determine consumer price judg-
ments: procedural and distributive price fairness (Maxwell 2007). Procedural price
fairness refers to the procedures or processes behind a pricing strategy, including
intentions (Campbell 1999) and the specific variables determining differential pricing
(Variable of Discrimination, VOD; Bayer 2010; Kuo et al. 2016). Distributive price
fairness refers to comparisons with respect to the outcome of other actors, which has
thus far often been interpreted as the offered price (see e.g. Ferguson et al. 2014; Xia
et al. 2004). This conceptualization, while informative, does not address distributive
fairness with regard to the distribution of consumer welfare. To integrate outcome
equalization into the analysis of consumer behavior under price discrimination, re-
search needs to relate price differences to differences in purchasing power and the
subsequent distribution of e.g. goods or income, rather than equating offered prices
with outcomes. For example, prices that are tailored towards different income groups
might be seen as distributively unfair because people have to pay different amounts
for the same good or service, but might simultaneously lead to a convergence of
consumer welfare, which could increase distributive fairness. This article therefore
refers to “outcomes” as the final distribution of consumer welfare, and interprets the
unequal treatment of consumers through price differences as a procedural variable.
Despite these standing conceptual differences, prior research clearly establishes
the importance of between-consumer comparisons for adverse reactions to price
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discrimination. One central tenet is that a consumer explicitly or implicitly refers to an
internal (e.g. Thaler 1985; Janiszewski and Lichtenstein 1999; Koszegi and Rabin 2006)
or external (e.g. Mayhew and Winer 1992; Dholakia and Simonson 2005) reference
point to assess whether an offered price is fair. Internal, memory-based reference
points are the prices that the consumer themselves paid in similar previous transactions
(Herz and Taubinsky 2018). External, interpersonal reference points are the prices
paid by one’s peers (Ho and Su 2009), i.e. other consumers (Haws and Bearden
2006; Jin et al. 2014), for an identical good. Although both factors are important,
there is evidence to suggest that interpersonal comparison has a larger impact on
consumers’ fairness perception than self-comparison (see e.g. Xia et al. 2004), which
is particularly relevant in modern online markets that exhibit high transparency and
extensive information sharing (Anderson and Simester 2008).
However, moving the analysis to the level of realized economic outcome distributions
requires a conceptual shift whereby potential preferences for equal outcomes are
tested within a price setting framework that replicates the important prerequisites of
consumer price comparisons.
1.2 Preferences for Equal Outcomes
There is ample evidence that people generally care about the equal distribution of
monetary outcomes (Fehr et al. 1993; Harrington Jr et al. 2016), particularly if existing
income inequalities are seen as arbitrary (Rutström and Williams 2000; Alesina and
Angeletos 2005; Durante et al. 2014).
Two very influential economic models propose that a person’s utility depends on
the outcome of other people, either because people experience disutility when their
outcome is different from other people’s outcomes (Fehr and Schmidt 1999), or because
their utility function depends on their share of total payoffs (Bolton and Ockenfels
2000). Thus, as long as differential pricing leads to a convergence of outcomes without
any (or many) consumer losses, it may not only be accepted by consumers, but even
be desirable.1
However, supporting results from the literature on inequity aversion and studies
showing human preferences for redistribution under unequal economic outcomes
1See Krawczyk and Le Lec (2010) for a model of procedural and distributive fairness that predicts
higher support of redistribution in such cases. See also Guo (2015) and Li and Jain (2016) for
theoretical analyses on how consumer inequity aversion and social preferences affect optimal buyer
strategies.
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cannot be readily applied to the context of price discrimination in consumer markets.
Foremost, this literature purposely abstracts from many process-related variables in
order to focus exclusively on outcome distributions. It thus factors out many elements
of the price setting mechanism, which could well interact with or mediate distribu-
tive preferences as well as their translation into behavior. For example, under price
discrimination, redistribution is not actively chosen by consumers, but imposed by
sellers. This evokes considerations regarding reciprocity (Fehr and Gächter 2000) and
consumers act as second, rather than first movers, strongly inhibiting their agency in
determining prices and thereby outcomes (Choshen-Hillel and Yaniv 2011; Alexopou-
los et al. 2013). Moreover, moral responsibility for causing fairer market outcomes is
shifted away from the consumer. At best, consumers may ascribe themselves moral
responsibility through their influence on future prices and thereby future outcomes
(Pigors and Rockenbach 2016).
1.3 Outcomes vs. Procedures
Overall, it remains unclear whether outcome equalization can alleviate behavioral
constraints to price discrimination. This will crucially depend on the extent to which
consumers weigh unequal price treatment (e.g., not being eligible for a price discount
other consumers receive; Ho and Su 2009; Ho et al. 2014) against the equalization of
consumer outcomes. This relationship is not obvious, since there is evidence from
outside the price literature that both outcomes (Lerner and Whitehead 1980; Rutte and
Messick 1995) and procedures (Folger and Konovsky 1989; Van den Bos, Vermunt, et al.
1997) could be more important in forming overall fairness judgments. In particular,
a large body of work highlights the role of procedural elements e.g., in bargaining
contexts (Trautmann 2009) or for contextual variables like norms (Garbarino and
Maxwell 2010) and consumer loyalty (Anderson and Simester 2010). Other research
finds equivalent effects on allocation acceptability (Bolton et al. 2005). According to Van
den Bos, Lind, et al. (1997), the availability of outcome information could mediate the
influence of procedural fairness. While procedures were significant in shaping fairness
judgments without outcome information, subjects who knew about the outcomes of
other participants did not appear to be significantly influenced by procedures. In
Bolton et al. (2005), fair outcomes were accepted irrespective of procedural bias.
Thus, in so far as these results translate into purchasing environments, consumers
who know that BPD only benefits those with lower incomes might accept or even
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support it. However, for consumers who do not receive information on other con-
sumers’ outcomes and experience relatively disadvantageous price discrimination,
the literature on price fairness and reference points suggests comparatively strong
aversions.
1.4 Study Overview
To assess consumer reactions towards BPD, we conducted a series of incentivized,
context-neutral, and controlled experimental studies on Amazon Mechanical Turk
(MTurk). Sellers could offer a price discount for low-income consumers, leading
to a convergence in consumer outcomes. Price discrimination was transparent and
high-income consumers could either costly switch to a second seller who did (not)
offer the discount, choose not to buy at all, or maximize their income by staying with
the same seller across all rounds. By quantifying both, behavioral shifts away from and
towards the price discriminating store, we were able to capture bidirectional consumer
migration patterns which have so far been largely neglected by the experimental
literature. This allowed us to make qualitative judgments about the net-effect of
BPD, rather than focusing solely on the behavioral constraints elicited by existing
consumers.
In the first study, high-income consumers received no explanation as to who ben-
efited from the price discount or how it was implemented. Whilst this masked an
important element of our framework, abstracting from differences in outcomes allowed
us to establish a first benchmark of consumer reactions towards differential downward
pricing. The second study addressed the role of reciprocity by keeping sellers out
of the price-setting process. By shifting responsibility for the pricing decision from
sellers to an algorithm, we were also able to examine the role of human intentional-
ity in consumer reactions to price discrimination. Studies 3 to 5 then progressively
introduced new process-related variables, endowing consumers with information and
agency that mirror important contextual variables of real-world consumer markets
and enable concrete between-consumer comparisons. In the third study, high-income
consumers learned that price discounts were available for low-income consumers
only. This change revealed the benevolent nature of our price discounts, and thus
introduced the interaction between unequal price treatment and an equalization of
consumer outcomes. Moreover, we used two mechanisms to allocate initial incomes.
In one condition, income was randomly assigned to consumers, in the other, consumer
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income was assigned based on their performance in a real-effort task. This allowed
us to test the prediction of equity theory (i.e. distributive fairness), whereby an out-
come distribution is perceived as fair if outcomes are proportional to an individuals’
input. In Study 4, we increased consumers’ moral responsibility for their purchasing
behavior by introducing a market mechanism which gave consumers agency over
future prices and thereby outcomes. Finally, we conducted three robustness checks
addressing transparency, the costs of switching and consumer motivations behind
their purchasing decisions.
Our results suggest widespread consumer aversions towards BPD. Across all studies,
between 30 %–40 % of consumers exhibited strictly BPD-averse purchasing patterns.
Reactions were the strongest in Study 1, where consumers did not receive any con-
textual explanations for price discrimination. As shown in Study 2, this behavior can
not be explained by consumers’ assumptions about seller intentions. That is, holding
seller intentions constant does not substantially affect consumer aversion towards BPD.
Even in Study 3, with a clear understanding that price discrimination only benefited
consumers who were arbitrarily assigned a lower income, every third consumer chose
to costly switch away from the price discriminating store. Endowing consumers with
agency through a market mechanism in Study 4 did slightly decrease costly switching,
but only if income differences were generated randomly. Contrary to studies 1–3, a
sizeable number of consumers was willing to support BPD by costly switching towards
the price-discriminating seller when consumer purchases influenced the store’s future
pricing strategy. Finally, Study 5 subsumes three robustness checks that confirm the
validity of our behavioral interpretations and show that results hold when consumers
decide under full transparency as well as for varying switching costs.
Overall, we show that outcome-fairness related reasoning mediates behavioral
consumer constraints only under very specific conditions. In particular, consumers
need to participate in determining future prices. Highlighting the re-distributive
nature of BPD has little effect on behavior, and contrary to much of the existing
literature on social preferences, consumers do not differentiate between merited and
unmerited income inequality. Even in the most benevolent case, a substantial share
of consumers is willing to give up money in order to switch to a competitor without
BPD despite no economic gains.
The complete data set, additional information and this project’s code can be accessed
under the following repository: https://s.gwdg.de/mwmBdv.
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2 Study I
Study 1 first used a simple one-shot design to elicit general consumer preferences
for price discrimination. Second, we examined whether these preferences generalize
to a more comprehensive multiple round within-subject scenario with monetary
“switching costs”. The latter reflects that in reality, punishing sellers for their pricing
strategy by purchasing elsewhere usually entails transaction costs – even in the case
of homogeneous goods (Nilssen 1992). Throughout both experiments, subjects did
not receive any explanation about the introduction of price discrimination. The
beneficiaries of BPD were kept private and consumers could not infer that price
discounts led to more equal outcomes. In reality, it is likely that BPD would be used
in situations where consumers cannot know how different prices are generated and
who benefits. As we will show in later studies, the main effects of this study replicate
to purchase environments where outcome equalization is transparent to consumers.
2.1 Experimental Design
Because the basic experimental setup was the same across all studies, we will describe
it here in more detail and refer to this description in the remainder of the paper.
We ran purchasing experiments where consumers had the option to buy a homo-
geneous good at one of two stores, each run by another participant acting as store
manager. We measure preferences for or against price discrimination by a consumer’s
store choice. We included a post-experimental questionnaire measuring participants’
fairness perceptions, attitudes towards price discrimination as well as a questionnaire
on social comparison (Gibbons and Buunk 1999). All experiments in this paper were
conducted online using MTurk and oTree (Chen et al. 2016). Participants enrolled on
their own accord and were randomly assigned to one treatment and one role. After the
instructions, participants had two attempts to answer five comprehension questions
correctly. Those who failed both attempts were excluded from participating. We
used “Coins” as our experimental currency. Coins were later converted into dollars,
where 10 coins equaled 3 cents. Additionally, subjects playing the role of “consumer”
received a fixed payment of $1.20 for completing the survey. There were two main
experimental paradigms to analyze consumer behavior: One-Shot and Repeated.
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One-Shot
Upon arrival, participants were randomly assigned the role of either a high-income
or a low-income consumer. High-income (low-income) consumers learned that they
would receive an endowment of 100 (50) Coins. Coins could be used to buy a good
at one of two stores (A, B). In both stores, the good returned a value of 150 Coins
to a consumer’s final payoff. Thus, consumers were incentivized to always buy the
good. The two stores sold the same good and were identical except for one thing: one
store offered all consumers the good for a price of 100 Coins. The other store offered
low-income consumers the good for a discounted price of 50 Coins and charged
high-income consumers the regular price of 100 Coins. Consumers learned that each
store was run by a manager, who had decided on the pricing strategy of the store
beforehand, and that managers earned money for each good sold in their store. This
ensured that consumer purchasing choices were meaningful.
Participants decided at which of the two stores they wanted to purchase the good.
High-income consumers could observe that one store offered the good at a price of 50
Coins and learned with a click that they were not eligible for that discount. However,
in Studies 1 and 2, no explanation for the different prices was given.
We randomized the position (left, right) and name (A, B) of the store introducing
price discrimination. Thus, if price discrimination had no impact, we would expect
consumers to be equally distributed across both stores.
Repeated
Compared to the one-shot design, consumers completed four purchasing rounds.
We did not change the basic parameters of the experiment. High-income consumers
received 100 Coins each round and could use them to purchase the good in either
store A or store B. Low-income consumers were not able to purchase a good in the
first two rounds and had to rely on an outside option that was a simple multiplier
of one. Endowments could not be transferred from one round to another. Thus, we
can rule out that consumers may respond to a switch in sellers pricing strategies by
delaying their purchases in anticipation of future discounts (Coase 1972).
To make switching meaningful, we introduced monetary costs for switching between
stores in two consecutive rounds. Consumers always started a round in the store
they chose the previous round. For example, if a consumer purchased the good in
store A in the first round, they started the second round in store A. If the consumer
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then decided to switch and purchase the good in store B, they had to pay a fee of
10 Coins, i.e. 10 % of their endowment per round. Thus, consumers were monetarily
disincentivized to switch and maximized their payoff by always purchasing from the
same store.
In the first two purchasing rounds, both stores offered the good for the same price.
After the second round, consumers learned that one of the two store managers changed
their pricing strategy and would offer low-income consumers the good for a price of
50 Coins in the remaining two rounds. Depending on treatment, this was either (i) the
manager of the store consumers had purchased in during the second round (Avoid) or
(ii) the manager of the store consumers had not purchased in during the second round
(Approach). Price discrimination was transparent to all consumers.
Compared to the one-shot design, this setup imposes stricter conditions on observing
consumer preferences against price discrimination. Subjects who switch away from
(or towards) the price discriminating store are willing to substantially reduce their
own payoff. Second, it allows us to analyze benevolent price discrimination, where
consumers who already participate in the market do not experience a price increase
and only low-income consumers who priorly could not purchase any goods benefit
from lower prices. Whereas in the one-shot design, consumers might perceive the
lower price to be at their own costs, the within-subject design establishes the reference
price of 100 Coins over two rounds and no consumer loses money as a result of price
discrimination. Importantly, low-income consumers miss out on substantial payoff
over the first two rounds, and the price discount in rounds three and four serves to
mitigate, but not fully eliminate unequal outcomes.
Manager
In each treatment, two participants were assigned the role of a store manager. Before
consumers made their choices, managers were free to decide whether they wanted to
implement a price discrimination strategy (a discount for low-income consumers) in
their store. In the Repeated treatments, price discounts could only be introduced after
the second round. Managers had full information about the experimental setup. We
gathered manager observations until we had one manager who decided for and one
manager who decided against price discrimination for each experimental treatment.
Hence, no deception was involved. Managers were rewarded with a base reward of
$0.50 and earned 1 Cent for each good sold in their store.
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Study 1
In Study 1, information on consumer endowment was private. High-income consumers
did neither know about the existence of low-income consumers, nor the endowment
of anybody else. They also did not receive any explanation about the price discount.
Participants were randomly assigned to One-Shot, Repeated-Avoid or Repeated-Approach.
We gathered data until we had 100 high-income consumers in each treatment and set
a fixed probability of 10 % for a participant to become a low-income consumer.
2.2 Results
We excluded all observations where a subject chose the outside option in the second
round. This left us with 96 independent observations in Avoid, 97 independent obser-
vations in Approach and 100 in One-Shot (47 % female). Our results confirm widespread
consumer aversion to price discrimination. Even more so, we find that a large share
of consumers is willing to incur costs in order to switch away from a benevolently
price-discriminating store without any possibility of subsequent monetary gains.
One-Shot
From now on, we will refer to high-income consumers as “consumers”. Low-income
consumers were irrelevant for our analysis and only served to avoid deception. As
hypothesized, a large majority of consumers preferred the non-price-discriminating
store (NoPD Store). Without any explanation for the observed price discrimination,
86 % of consumers purchased the good in the store that charged all consumers the
same price, 9 % purchased in store with price discounts and 5 % chose the outside
option. A one sample t-test also confirmed consumers to significantly prefer the
non-price-discriminating store (t = 14.25, p = 0.000). The name (χ̃2 = 1.33, p = 0.25)
and position (χ̃2 = 1.66, p = 0.20) of the store introducing price discrimination did
not have a significant effect on store choice.
Result 1 Under scarce information, consumers exhibit strong preferences against a price
discriminating store.
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Figure 1 — The two most common behavioral patterns in Avoid
Note. The two most common purchase patterns were “self-interested” and “anti-pd”. Con-
sumers classified as self-interested never switched to the other store. Consumers classified
as anti-pd stayed within the same store for the first two rounds and then switched after their
store introduced price discrimination.
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Repeated-Avoid
In the first two rounds, both stores offered the good for the same price. After the
second round, consumers learned that the store they chose in the second round offered
some consumers lower prices. Figure 1 illustrates the two most common behavioral
patterns in the Avoid treatment. We find that 47 % of consumers never switched and
maximized their payoff. We classify those consumer as “self-interested”. Surprisingly,
almost as many consumers decided to costly switch away from a benevolently price-
discriminating store. We classify those consumers who stayed in the same store for
the first two rounds, switched after the second round, and stayed in the other store
for the third and fourth round as “anti-pd”.2 Using this conservative measure, 40 %
of consumers exhibited the corresponding pattern. To support this conjunction, we
ran a paired t-test to test whether consumers were less likely to purchase in the price
discriminating store after it had introduced price discrimination, i.e. in round three
and four. On average, consumers purchased 1.91 out of 2 goods in round one and
two in the price-discriminating store, and only 1.04 out of 2 in rounds three and four
(t = −8.64, p = 0.000).
Throughout this paper, we will use a random effects panel logistic regression model
with clustered standard errors to confirm and expand on our findings. In accordance
with the results above, we report a significant and large effect of the BPD-dummy on
a subject’s probability to purchase in the price-discriminating store (see Tables 9 and 8
in the appendix).
Result 2 Under scarce information, roughly 40 % of consumers costly punish a benevolently
price-discriminating store.
Repeated-Approach
In Approach, price discrimination was introduced by the store not chosen by a con-
sumer in the second round. This setup was designed to capture positive reactions
towards BPD. 80 % of consumers followed the self-interested pattern, whereas only 4 %
2We can rule out egalitarian motives towards the managers’ income distribution as a reason for
consumer switching, because we did not tell participants how many rounds they would play.
Thus, consumers who wanted both managers to earn the same would have already switched in
the second round. A few consumers seemed to exhibit these egalitarian preferences. Text data
from an open-ended question in the questionnaire of later studies also confirms the validity of our
categorization.
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switched to the price-discriminating store. A paired t-test showed no significant differ-
ences in the likelihood that a consumer purchased the good in the price-discriminating
store between rounds 1 and 2 versus 3 and 4. On average, consumers purchased
0.07 out of 2 goods in round one and two in the price-discriminating store, and
0.12 out of 2 after the introduction of price discrimination in rounds three and four
(t = 0.96, p = 0.339).
Result 3 Consumers are generally not willing to costly support a benevolently price-discrimi-
nating store under scarce information.
Consumer Attitudes
Table 1 shows subjects’ evaluations for a selection of post-experimental questions from
Avoid.3 There are only few differences between self-interested and anti-pd consumers.
Descriptively, those who costly switched away from the price-discriminating store
found price discrimination on average fairer (but still very unfair) than those who
decided to stay in the same store throughout all four purchasing rounds. Since both
groups also did not differ on the Social Comparison Orientation scale, the recorded
attitudes suggest that in the no-information context, peer-induced fairness concerns
cannot explain adverse consumer reactions towards BPD. While price-discrimination
was seen as unfair by almost everybody, perceptions of unfairness do not appear to be
a sufficient condition for costly switching.
Instead, consumer behavior might be partially driven by perceptions of intention and
exploitation. Subjects categorized as anti-pd were less likely to ascribe good intentions
to the introduction of price discrimination and thought more often that their manager
wanted to take advantage of them (t = 1.80, p = 0.075). They also found costly
punishment to reduce the manager’s income fairer. This interpretation would be in
line with attribution theory (Fiske and Taylor 2013), whereby unfair acts by a causal
agent can cause the attribution of blame and motivational beliefs.
2.3 Discussion
We show that a large share of consumers costly punishes store managers even when
they are not negatively affected by the introduction of price discrimination. Forty per-
3Because participants in Approach did not significantly react towards price discrimination, we refrain















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































38 consumer behavior under benevolent price discrimination
cent of consumers exhibit strictly averse behavioral patterns by engaging in inefficient
switching and punishing the differential price decrease. In total, the number of goods
sold by the price-discriminating store decreases by roughly 45 %.
These results cannot be explained by fairness concerns or social comparison. Rather,
subjects appear to assign bad intentions to the introduction of price discrimination.
One reason might be that subjects in this study received no information about either the
goal, the reasons or the beneficiaries of price discrimination. Without any salient point
of comparison or justification mechanism, subjects were free in their interpretation
of the manager’s actions. These were largely judged to be unfair, regardless of
the subject’s behavior. This interpretation is coherent with a number of studies on
attribution theory, showing that people have a strong tendency to infer causes and
assign responsibility, especially when outcomes are perceived to be unfair (Heider
1982; Blount 1995; Falk et al. 2008).
In order to better understand the motives behind consumer aversions towards BPD,
we conducted a follow-up study designed to control for manager intentions. If rather
than fairness, the ascription of intentions and bad motives drive consumer punishment,
we would expect less inefficient switching as a response to price discrimination. Study
2 also controls for negative reciprocity towards the store manager as a reason for
switching between stores.
3 Study II
We eliminated any intentionality behind price discrimination by keeping managers
out of the price-setting process. Consumers learned that both managers decided to let
a pricing algorithm determine store prices, instead of setting prices themselves. They
were told that managers had no information about how the algorithm determined
prices and could therefore not predict changes caused by the algorithm. This setup
ensures that we isolate the effect of differing intentions: subjects can still punish the
manager of the price-discriminating store for bearing responsibility for choosing the
algorithm in the first place.4 To the extent that subjects are willing to attribute motives,
4Importantly, this setup ensures meaningful punishment, since switching decreases the income of
a related actor, rather than an innocent bystander. The popular choice of substituting the human
decision-maker with e.g. a computer or an algorithm would not only render punishment arbitrary,
but eliminate a whole host of other variables we cannot account for.
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e.g. carelessness, these motives should not differ between both managers since they
made the same decision under the same information.
3.1 Experimental Design
To test for the effect of intentionality, we ran two treatments (Intention and No Intention)
of a slightly adjusted version of our (repeated) Avoid setup from Study 1.5 Whereas In-
tention simply replicated the first study, No Intention introduced the pricing algorithms
mentioned in the previous paragraph.6 One algorithm was randomly selected to
price discriminate, the other one did not change prices throughout the task. We gath-
ered 200 consumer observations per treatment and extended the post-experimental
questionnaire to better evaluate the effectiveness of our manipulation (see the online
appendix for an overview).
3.2 Results
We excluded all observations where a subject chose to rely on the outside option
in the second round. This left us with 198 independent observations in Intention
and 193 independent observations in No_Intention (52% female). Our results indicate
that intentions are not the main driver of consumer aversions against BPD. Across
both treatments, a significant share of consumers is willing to costly punish the price
discriminating store manager.
Manipulation Check
Our manipulation of intentionality should have two effects: First, when asked about
the intentions behind the manager action triggering price discrimination7, we expected
subjects in No Intention to ascribe more “neutral” intentions. Second, since both
managers made the exact same decision, we expected no differences in the ascribed
intentions between both managers in No Intention. Table 2 shows average consumer
5Because consumers appeared to have no preferences for price discrimination in Study 1, we omit a
follow-up analysis for Approach.
6Before launching the main experiment, we gathered two manager observations per treatment. In No
Intention, both managers decided to delegate price-setting to their respective algorithm.
7i.e. the intentions behind offering some consumers lower prices in Intention, and the intentions behind
choosing the pricing algorithm in No Intention
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sentiments towards the price-discriminating manager over the whole sample by
treatment.
Subjects in Intention evaluated the intention of the price-discriminating store man-
ager to be both significantly less good as well as significantly more bad. For No
Intention, the averages are closer to the “neutral” point of 4 on the response scale. Fur-
thermore, subjects in Intention were more likely to think that the price-discriminating
manager had the intention of exploiting them. Thus, our manipulation seems to have
worked in the desired direction.
The differences in ascribed intentions between the two managers in No Intention are
more ambivalent. For all three questions capturing a manager’s intentions, subjects
ascribed more positive intentions to the manager whose algorithm did not introduce
the lower price for some consumers. That was true when asked whether (i) the
manager’s intention to choose the pricing algorithm was bad (PD: 3.39, NoPD: 2.76;
t = 4.96 , p = 0.000), (ii) the manager’s intention to choose the pricing algorithm
was good (PD: 4.47, NoPD: 5.11; t = −5.58, p = 0.000) or (iii) the manager tried
to take advantage of the consumer (PD: 3.57, NoPD: 2.34; t = 8.49, p = 0.000).
However, when compared to Intention, the differences between the evaluation of both
managers are much smaller. For differences of 0.63, 0.65 and 1.23 in No Intention, we
record differences of 2.64, 2.47 and 2.64 in Intention. Hence we still affirm that our
manipulation worked in the desired direction.
Main Results
First, we replicate our results from Study 1. In Intention (No Intention), 37 % (30 %) of
consumers were willing to costly switch away from a benevolently price-discriminating
store, while 45 % (49 %) acted monetarily self-interested. We further identify a third
group of subjects who switched within the first two rounds and settled for the non-
price discriminating store afterwards (10 %). Since subjects did not know about the
number of rounds beforehand, this might be interpreted as egalitarian preferences, i.e.
a preference for both managers to earn the same, until price discrimination swayed
them towards one store. The average number of goods sold by the price-discriminating
store decreased significantly with the introduction of price discrimination in round
three and forth in both Intention (t = −13.23, p = 0.000) and No Intention (t =
−11.02, p = 0.000).
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Table 2 — Consumer attitudes by experimental condition
By experimental condition
Intention No intention Diff.
Short description of questionnaire item Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t-stat.
Fairness of PD1 2.27 (1.44) 2.41 (1.55) −0.90
Good intentions of PD manager2 2.56 (1.51) 4.47 (1.66) −11.91***
Bad intentions of PD manager3 5.31 (1.60) 3.39 (1.82) 11.11***
Exploitation by PD manager4 5.02 (1.75) 3.57 (2.01) 7.63***
Accountability of PD manager5 5.69 (1.70) 3.81 (2.08) 9.78***
Note. All questions were answered on a 7-point scale. Superscript 1: 1 (unfair) to 7 (fair). Superscripts
2–4: 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Superscript 5: 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much); 1“Please
rate how fair you think it is that [Intention: manager A/B; No intention: Store A/B’s algorithm]
decided to offer some consumers lower prices for the same good”, 2“Manager A/B’s intention for
[Intention: introducing interpersonal price differences; No intention: choosing the pricing algorithm]
was good.”, 3Wording is equal to row 2, except last word is “bad”, 4“Manager A/B intended to
take advantage of me (the consumer).”, 5“How much do you hold Manager A/B accountable for
not being offered the good at the lower price?”; The reported t-statistic results from a two-sample
mean-comparison t-tests by behavioral pattern; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Second, we find moderate evidence for small treatment differences. While the share
of subjects classified as anti-pd drops by seven percentage points in No Intention, a
t-test comparing the average number of goods sold by the price-discriminating store
during rounds three and four in Intention (0.98) and No Intention (1.09) shows no
significant difference (t = 1.1, p = 0.270). The regression model reveals a significant
interaction between the introduction of BPD and Intention (see Table 9), suggesting
that subjects were less likely to purchase in the price-discriminating store after the
introduction of BPD when the decision was made by a store manager instead of
a pricing algorithm. Overall, the main results hold irrespective of whether price-
discrimination is introduced by the manager themselves or an autonomous pricing
algorithm. Our manipulation succeeded in partially neutralizing consumer perceptions
of manager intentions and significantly reduced the perceived differences in intentions
between the two managers. We take these results as evidence that consumer aversion
towards benevolent price-discrimination is largely independent of manager intentions.
Despite controlling for intentions, all three behavioral patterns are largely consistent
across the two treatments.
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Result 4 Consumer aversion to benevolent price discrimination under information scarcity is
not driven by perceived manager intentions.
Consumer Attitudes
Table 3 shows subjects’ attitudes for a selection of post-experimental questionnaire
items. Notably, subjects categorized as anti-pd were significantly more neutral in
their assessment of the price-discriminating manager’s intentions when they learned
that the manager had delegated price-setting to a “black-box” algorithm. This again
suggests that manager intentions were not the primary driver of costly switching.
Subjects in No Intention also tended to hold the manager less accountable. However,
there were no differences in the perception of fairness regarding the introduction
of price discrimination as well as perceived levels of exploitation. Irrespective of
treatment, subjects judged price discrimination to be very unfair and felt exploited.
However, anti-pd consumers found price discrimination significantly more unfair than
self-interested consumers (Intention: t = −3.66, p = 0.000).8 The fact that both groups
found price discrimination unfair does suggest, however, that fairness perceptions are
neither the sole, nor a sufficient driver of costly punishment. For all other items, the
differences between treatments and categories are as expected and in line with Study
1.
3.3 Discussion
We show that consumer aversions to benevolent price discrimination under scarce
information persist even when we control for manager intentions. The share of
consumers willing to costly switch away from a store that introduces downward price
discrimination remains high, and the store sells between 48 % (Intention) and 40 %
(No Intention) less as a result. In sum, the two studies suggest consumer aversion to
benevolent price discrimination to be a widespread phenomenon that does not depend
on the ascription of bad motives or intentions. Rather, a large share of consumers
seems to object to the general concept, at least in a situation of information scarcity.
While the prevalence of costly switching may appear high, the finding itself is in
line with the existing literature on consumer attitudes towards and perceptions of
8For No Intention, the results are not significant (t = −1.77, p = 0.079).
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Table 3 — Consumer attitudes by behavioral patterns and experimental condition
By experimental condition
Behavioral pattern
Short description of questionnaire item
Intention No intention Diff.
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t-stat.
self-interested
Fairness of PD1 2.62 (1.57) 2.51 (1.58) 0.48
Fairness of punishment by switching2 5.30 (1.64) 4.29 (1.85) 3.92***
Good intentions of PD manager3 2.89 (1.64) 4.72 (1.57) −7.76***
Bad intentions of PD manager4 4.99 (1.79) 3.18 (1.69) 7.05***
Exploitation by PD manager5 4.69 (1.91) 3.23 (1.95) 5.12***
Feel exploited by PD manager6 5.08 (1.64) 4.90 (1.78) 0.69
Accountability of PD manager7 5.12 (1.90) 3.00 (1.93) 7.52***
SCO8 4.26 (1.23) 4.27 (1.08) −0.04
anti-pd
Fairness of PD1 1.82 (1.13) 2.05 (1.47) −1.01
Fairness of punishment by switching2 6.57 (0.97) 5.89 (1.63) 2.94***
Good intentions of PD manager3 2.19 (1.28) 4.11 (1.69) −7.40***
Bad intentions of PD manager4 5.62 (1.32) 3.88 (1.91) 6.17***
Exploitation by PD manager5 5.54 (1.42) 4.30 (2.04) 4.12***
Feel exploited by PD manager6 6.00 (1.27) 6.02 (1.32) −0.08
Accountability of PD manager7 6.49 (0.97) 4.95 (1.85) 6.16***
SCO8 4.57 (1.12) 4.31 (1.06) 1.30
Note. All questions were answered on a 7-point scale. Superscript 1: 1 (unfair) to 7 (fair). Super-
scripts 2–4: 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Superscript 5: 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much);
1“Please rate how fair you think it is that [Intention: manager A/B; No intention: Store A/B’s al-
gorithm] decided to offer some consumers lower prices for the same good”, 2“The more goods a
store sells, the higher the income of the participant acting as its manager. Do you consider it fair to
switch from Store A/B to Store B/A in order to reduce manager A/B’s profit because of their pricing
strategy?”, 3“Manager A/B’s intention for [Intention: introducing interpersonal price differences; No
intention: choosing the pricing algorithm] was good.”, 4Wording is equal to row 2, except last word is
“bad”, 5“Manager A/B intended to take advantage of me (the consumer).”, 6“The fact that [Intention:
Manager A/B, No intention: Store A/B’s algorithm] decided to offer some consumers lower prices
makes me feel taken advantage of.”, 7“How much do you hold Manager A/B accountable for not
being offered the good at the lower price?”,8Mean of Social comparison orientation scale by Gibbons
and Buunk (1999); The reported t-statistic results from a two-sample mean-comparison t-tests by
behavioral pattern; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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price discrimination. What happens, however, when we allow for some amount
of information on the consumer side? It is likely that consumers often have some
information about the rules by which interpersonal price differences are determined.
Intuitively, one probable reason for the wide acceptance of student discounts is that
students tend to have less money. Consumers might thus be more forgiving to
the practice of downward price adjustments, because it decreases inequality. More
generally, one might hypothesize that benevolent price discrimination becomes more
accepted once consumers are aware who benefits, i.e. consumers with a lower income
who otherwise would not be able to participate in the market. If true, transparency
could be an efficient way of dealing with negative consumer reactions in the context of
price discrimination. To test these assertions, the following studies extend our analysis
of consumer behavior under BPD to situations where consumers know how the seller
discriminates and who the beneficiaries are.
4 Study III
We extended the experimental design by two crucial features. First, we made the
variable of discrimination, i.e. income, transparent to all consumers. Second, we intro-
duced two different causes of income inequality. Endowments were either allocated
randomly (Random) or based on the performance (Effort) in a real-effort slider task (Gill
and Prowse 2012). Consumers only knew by which mechanism endowments were
allocated, but not the exact endowment levels. That is, consumers in Effort knew that
their performance would influence their endowment, but were not informed about the
exact functional relationship. Consumers received either the high or low endowment
based on a fixed performance threshold.9
High-income consumers in Study 3 knew that (i) low-income consumers existed,
(ii) low-income consumers could not afford to buy a good for the initial uniform
price, (iii) only low-income consumers benefited from price discrimination and (iv)
high- and low-income consumers could afford the same amount of goods under
price discrimination. Because price discounts do not negatively affect high-income
consumer welfare, increase the number of consumers able to participate in the market
and increase overall welfare, we expected relatively little switching away from the price
9The threshold was 31 sliders over three rounds of 60 seconds each. We followed a pretest with 100
participants and selected the cut-off for the 10th percentile.
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discriminating store (Avoid). Likewise, we expected some high-income consumers to
support the price discriminating store by switching towards it (Approach). We also
expected high-income consumers in Effort to exhibit stronger aversions towards BPD
than those in Random. That is because high-income consumers might feel entitled to
higher payoffs when they are earned by greater effort in the slider task. BPD, in that
sense, undermines a merit-based advantage.
4.1 Experimental Design
The experiment consisted of six treatments. We gathered observations until we had 100
high-income consumers in each treatment with a fixed probability of 10 % to become a
low-income consumer in Random.
The basic procedure of the experiment mirrored Study 1. In Random, we added
one page where participants learned about the random endowment mechanism. In
Effort, participants first completed three rounds of an effort task based on sliders.
After being informed about their endowment, consumers indicated their agreement to
two statements on a seven point Likert-scale to validate our manipulation. In both
treatments, we asked whether it would be fair if every consumer received the same
endowment, and whether it was fair that (1) endowments were allocated randomly or
(2) better performances in the slider task were rewarded with a higher endowment.
Consumers then proceeded with the original instructions. Participants who completed
the effort task but failed to answer the comprehension questions correctly were paid
the base reward of $1.20.
4.2 Results
After excluding all observations where a subject chose the outside option in the
second round, we were left with 597 participants (47 % female). Our results show that
consumer aversions towards BPD persist under full transparency and are not affected
by the cause of income inequality. Even with the information that price discrimination
only benefits consumers who otherwise cannot participate in the market, a large
share of consumers is willing to engage in costly, inefficient switching to punish the
price-discriminating store. Similar to Study 1, almost no consumer costly supports
BPD.
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Figure 2 — Behavioral patterns across the four conditions from Study 3.
One-Shot
In Effort, consumers found a hypothetically equal distribution of endowments signifi-
cantly more unfair than in Random (Effort: 2.52, Random: 6.42; t = 18.31, p = 0.000).
They also found the mechanism by which differences in endowments were achieved
significantly fairer (Effort: 6.37, Random: 4.22; t = −9.34, p = 0.000). This affirms that
subjects in Effort perceived differences in income and thereby different purchasing
abilities as more fair, presumably because they were rooted in merit.
Regarding store choices, consumers in the one-shot experiment still exhibited strong
aversions against price discrimination, albeit weaker than in Study 1. In Random, almost
67 % of consumers chose to purchase in the non-price-discriminating store. In Effort,
the share was around 72 %. The difference was not significant (t = 1.46, p = 0.146).
Repeated-Avoid
Results for the manipulation check are in line with the ones from One-Shot and confirm
the success of our intervention. In Avoid, we largely replicate the results from Study 1
for both Effort and Random (see Figure 2).
Surprisingly, we find no differences between price discrimination over merit-based
compared to arbitrary income inequality. In both treatments, one third of consumers
was willing to costly switch to a non-price-discriminating store. Note that this was
with the information that only low-income consumers who otherwise were not able
to participate in the market benefited from price discrimination, while nobody in-
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curred any income loss. Consumers purchased significantly less goods in the price
discriminating store after the introduction of price discrimination (Effort: 1.11 vs. 1.86,
t = −7.61, p = 0.000; Random: 1.11 vs. 1.88, t = −8.22, p = 0.000). There was no
significant treatment difference (t = −0.10, p = 0.923) and a random effects logistic
regression revealed no significant interaction between Effort and the introduction of
BPD over the whole sample (see Table 9).
Result 5 Consumer aversions to BPD persist under full information about the VOD and the
beneficiaries.
Result 6 Consumers do not differentiate between BPD over merit-based inequality and BPD
over arbitrary inequality.
Repeated-Approach
In accordance with Study 1, almost no consumer was willing to costly support a
benevolently price discriminating store. Instead, the majority of consumers exhibited
self-interested behavior patterns (Effort: 79 %, Random: 81 %). Only four and five
percent respectively followed the pro-pd pattern. Paired t-tests suggest that consumers
did not significantly change their behavior once the other store introduced price
discrimination (Effort: 0.17 vs. 0.11, t = 1.10, p = 0.275; Random: 0.15 vs. 0.11,
t = 0.68, p = 0.495). There are no significant treatment differences.
Consumer Attitudes
Table 4 shows consumer attitudes of the whole sample as well as segmented by
treatment. Differences in Avoid point in the expected direction, but are not significant.
For Approach, despite equal switching behavior, subjects in Random perceived price
discrimination as significantly fairer and ascribed more positive intentions to the
manager of the price discriminating store. These results are in accordance with
Studies 1 and 2, whereby feelings of unfairness and the ascription of intentions are
not sufficient to explain consumer behavior under BPD.
4.3 Discussion
Consumer aversions towards BPD are not restricted to decision-making under scarce
information. Our results indicate that a large share of consumers is willing to costly
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Table 4 — Consumer attitudes by behavioral patterns and experimental condition
By experimental condition
Experimental condition
Short description of questionnaire item
Effort Random Diff.
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t-stat.
Avoid
Fairness of PD1 3.71 (2.09) 4.07 (2.12) −1.20
Fairness of punishment by switching2 5.05 (1.88) 4.79 (1.97) 0.95
Good intentions of PD manager3 4.33 (1.84) 4.38 (1.93) −0.19
Exploitation by PD manager4 3.25 (1.99) 3.55 (2.10) −1.04
SCO5 4.38 (1.29) 4.33 (1.42) 0.26
Approach
Fairness of PD1 3.68 (1.93) 4.80 (2.08) −3.95***
Fairness of switching to increase profit2 4.47 (1.80) 4.80 (1.85) −1.28
Good intentions of PD manager3 4.17 (1.77) 5.18 (1.78) −4.02***
Exploitation by PD manager4 3.27 (1.76) 2.79 (1.89) 1.86*
SCO5 4.54 (1.21) 4.31 (1.26) 1.33
Note. All questions were answered on a 7-point scale. Superscripts 3, 4: scale ranged from 1 (un-
fair) to 7 (fair). Superscripts 1, 2, 5: scale ranged or from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree);
1“Please rate how fair you think it is that manager A/B decided to offer consumers who [Effort:
earned a lower endowment in the slider task, Random: randomly received a lower endowment] lower
prices for the same good.”, 2“The more goods a store sells, the higher the income of the partici-
pant acting as its manager. Do you consider it fair to switch from Store A/B to Store B/A in order
to [Avoid: reduce, Approach: Increase] manager [Avoid: A/B’s, Approach: B/A’s] profit because of
their pricing strategy?”, 3“Manager A/B’s intention for introducing interpersonal price differences
was good.”, 4“Manager A/B intended to take advantage of me (the consumer).”, 5Mean of Social
comparison orientation scale by Gibbons and Buunk (1999); The reported t-statistic results from a
two-sample mean-comparison t-tests by behavioral pattern; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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switch away from a benevolently price-discriminating store, even when price discrimi-
nation only benefits low-income consumers. Given that it was, by design, impossible
for low-income consumers to earn a higher total payment than high-income con-
sumers, this behavior is largely inconsistent with inequality aversion and the concept
of distributive fairness. Although we document a qualitative drop in anti-pd subjects
compared to the first two studies, equalizing outcomes does not seem to substantially
alleviate behavioral constraints towards BPD. As before, net consumer switching is
clearly negative for the store that introduces price discrimination. What is more, con-
sumers appear to disregard the cause of income inequality. In contrast to the existing
literature on economic inequality and re-distributive preferences, consumer choice
under BPD does not dependent on whether differences in initial endowments are
earned or arbitrary. One possible explanation might simply be that procedural fairness
judgments, i.e. charging different prices for the same good, are much more important
in determining consumer behavior than outcome-related reasoning. If consumers do
not think about the distribution of economic outcomes but are instead purely focused
on the process, it follows that the source of income inequality is a negligible factor.
This would also explain why so many consumers are willing to give up a substantial
portion of their endowment to decrease the income of a seller who did nothing to
reduce their outcome.
An alternative explanation is that the top-down approach by which sellers impose
differential pricing reduces both the moral responsibility and agency of consumers in
causing more equal outcomes. Because in our setup the “future market” is unaffected
by consumer decisions, and consumers do not decide whether low-income consumers
receive discounts, they might exhibit patterns that are different from e.g. voting for
re-distributive policies. To test this explanation, Study 4 extends our design by a
second period to simulate agency through a market environment.
5 Study IV
We examine whether consumer aversions towards BPD as well as consumers’ disregard
of arbitrary vs. merit-based inequality generalize to a market-analogous situation
where consumers’ purchasing decisions affect a store’s future pricing strategy. By
endowing current consumers with agency over the price-setting process for a later
period, we induce externalities on their purchasing decisions and thus agency regard-
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ing future consumer outcomes. Consumers are responsible for future overall welfare
as well as the potential equalization of outcomes induced by BPD. Those who still
switch away from the price discriminating store essentially pay to decrease seller and
low-income consumer profits as well as to prevent a more equal outcome distribution.
5.1 Experimental Design
We implemented two (Avoid vs. Approach) 2x2 mixed factorial designs manipulating
the source of income inequality (Random vs. Effort) as well as the agency of consumers
regarding the price-discriminating store’s pricing strategy in a future task (Agency
vs. No agency). The No agency treatments were equivalent to the corresponding Avoid
conditions in Study 3. For the agency treatments, we added one screen after the
store’s introduction of price discrimination. On this screen, subjects were informed
that the discriminating store’s sales in the remaining two rounds would determine
its price-setting in a future HIT on MTurk. If sales exceeded a certain threshold, a
rule would automatically implement the lower prices for low-income consumers in
the last two rounds of a future setup-equivalent task. Otherwise, future low-income
consumers would not be able to purchase the good at the reduced price. We thereby
foreclosed any considerations regarding differing manager income levels or reverse
outcome inequalities.10
For both Avoid and Approach, we gathered 150 high-income consumer observations
per treatment and set a fixed probability of two percent to become a low-income
consumer in Random.
5.2 Results Avoid
After dropping subjects who chose the outside option in round two, the final sample
consisted of 586 observations (49 % female). Our results largely replicate Study 3, once
again establishing the robustness of consumer aversions towards BPD, but also hint
that under agency, consumers are more likely to reject BPD when income differences
are rooted in merit.
10Specifying that low-income consumers would receive the discount only for two rounds ensures that
it is impossible for them to earn more money in total than regular consumers.
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Figure 3 — Behavioral patterns across the four conditions from Study 4, Avoid
Manipulation Check Avoid
To check that subjects understood our manipulation, we extended the post-experimental
questionnaire by a control question about the future impact of their purchase decisions,
asking subjects to choose the correct statement out of four options. In total, 76 % of
subjects answered the questions correctly. Since there could be multiple reasons why
participants might answer the question incorrectly, we do not drop observations based
on the manipulation check. Instead, we will use the results from the sub-sample of
subjects who correctly answered the question as a robustness check.
Main Results Avoid
In line with Study 3, 58 % (56 %) of subjects in the No agency treatments of Effort
(Random) decided to stay in the same store for the whole experiment. Similarly, 31 %
and 29 % respectively exhibited strictly anti price-discrimination behavioral patterns
by switching after the introduction of discounted prices. Endowing subjects with
agency regarding future consumer welfare does not appear to fundamentally shift
behavior (see Figure 3).
In Agency, Effort, 32 % are categorized as anti-pd. In Random, that share drops to 23 %.
Contrary to the No agency treatments, we document a significant difference in the drop
of sales conditional on the source of endowment differences. In Random, the store
introducing BPD experienced a significantly smaller decline in demand (Effort: -0.72,
Random: -0.54; t = −1.56, p = 0.06), which is accentuated when restricting the sample
to subjects who correctly answered the control question (t = −1.89, p = 0.03). The
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regression model replicates this effect across the whole sample through a significant
interaction between the Effort-Dummy and the BPD-Dummy. Further and in line with
the descriptive results, agency and benevolent price discrimination are positively – but
not significantly – correlated in predicting purchases at the price-discriminating store
(see Table 9).
Overall, there is moderate evidence that under agency, the source of endowment
differences becomes more meaningful and consumers tend to switch less. However,
differences are small and only marginally significant, depending on the sample.
Result 7 Consumer aversions to BPD persist when consumer choices determine future prices.
As expected given the procedural nature of the intervention, subject answers in
the post-experimental questionnaire did not differ substantially (see Table 6 in the
appendix).
5.3 Results Approach
Our final sample consisted of 589 (50 % female) observations. 76 % of subjects answered
the control question correctly. In No agency, consumers generally do not support BPD
by switching towards the store. Once consumers are endowed with some agency,
the price-discriminating store sells significantly more goods in rounds three and four.
There are no differences between Effort and Random.
Main Results Approach
The No agency treatments closely replicate our results from Study 3 (see Figure 4).
The majority of consumers maximized their income by staying in the same store
for all four rounds and the price-discriminating store sold roughly the same amount
before and after the introduction of discounts for low-income consumers (Effort:
t = 0.29, p = 0.769; Random: t = 0.27, p = 0.787). Once consumers were endowed
with some agency regarding future store prices, their purchasing behavior changed
significantly. The share of subjects classified as pro-pd roughly doubled with 10 % in
Effort-Agency and 12 % in Random-Agency. In Effort-Agency, the price discriminating
store sold 0.09 goods on average over the first two rounds, and 0.30 goods over rounds
three and four – a significant increase (t = 3.89, p = 0.000). The results for Random-
Agency are similar (0.08 vs. 0.32; t = 4.04, p = 0.000) and there are no significant
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Figure 4 — Behavioral patterns across the four conditions from Study 4, Approach
treatment differences between the two (t = 0.25, p = 0.802). The seller introducing
BPD after the second round sold significantly more in Effort-Agency than in Effort-
No agency (t = −2.94, p = 0.013) and more in Random-Agency than in Random-No
agency (t = −2.21, p = 0.028). Concurrently, the regression model reveals a significant
interaction between BPD and the Agency treatment dummy on store choice. The source
of endowment does not predict switching.
Result 8 Endowing consumers with agency over future prices increases costly support for
BPD.
Differences in self-reported consumer attitudes between agency treatments are again
minimal (see Table 7 in the appendix).
5.4 Discussion
The results show that a salient market mechanism, which endows consumers with
agency over future prices for low-income consumers significantly increases costly
support of BPD, while aversions persist. A large share of consumers continues to
switch away from the price discriminating store, and there is only little evidence that
costly switching might decrease as a function of consumer influence. However, we
do find a relatively large effect of agency on consumer switching towards the price
discriminating store. This effect holds irrespective of the cause for income differences.
We think that there are two main reasons for the increased acceptance and support
of BPD. First, some consumers might feel morally obligated to accept or support lower
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prices for poor consumers once their actions determine future outcomes. Second,
introducing a second period allows (or forces) consumers to ascribe themselves some
responsibility for changing the outcome of low income consumers. Thus, introducing
agency increases the significance of outcome-related reasoning, as consumers are
forced to take the future impact of their purchase decisions into account. We deduce
that greater consumer agency increases the importance of outcome equalization and
distributive fairness for judging BPD, consequently leading to more support and
potentially less aversion. The more differences in income are based on merit, the
higher the behavioral constraints on BPD.
6 Study V
Study 5 combines three robustness checks to our main results. First, we increased the
salience of low-income consumers and disclosed their endowment of 50 Coins per
round to all consumers. Before, consumers only knew that low-income consumers
received a lower endowment, they did not know their exact endowment. This infor-
mation does not change any behavioral predictions regarding distributive fairness and
outcome equalization. However, it made it harder for high-income consumers to e.g.
strategically ignore that low-income consumers could not purchase anything before
the introduction of BPD. It also highlighted that price discrimination merely led to a
convergence in payoff – low-income consumers remained considerably poorer than
high-income consumers. Moreover, while consumers where treated unequally with
respect to absolute prices, they were treated equally in that everybody was priced
relative to their endowment.
Second, we varied switching costs to assess how sensitive consumer choices were
towards the ease of switching. In reality, this could for instance be determined by
the purchase environment (online vs. analog), the level of market competition or the
availability of substitutes.
Third, we summarize and analyse text data from an open-ended question on
consumer behavior to demonstrate data quality, confirm the validity of our behavioral
labels and highlight some alternative consumer reasoning. We show that consumer
animosity towards BPD exceeds quantifiable switching rates and that economic self-
interest disciplines inefficient consumer reactions.
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6.1 Robustness Check: Salience
We implemented a 2 (Approach vs. Avoid) x 2 (Effort vs. Random) mixed-factorial design
that replicated the agency-treatments from Study 4 with additional information on
the income of low-income consumers as well as their ability to purchase exactly one
good per round after the introduction of price discounts. In such a framework, we
would expect maximal impact of outcome-related fairness concerns. We collected 150
independent observations per treatment. Dropping all subjects who chose the outside
option in the second round left us with 592 (51 % female) total subjects.
Results
Results closely follow the findings from Study 4 (see Table 5). Consumer still exhib-
ited substantial aversions towards BPD while the majority followed a self-interested
behavioral pattern. There was both significant consumer emigration from (Avoid),
as well as migration to (Approach) the price discriminating store (see also Tables 9
and 8 in the appendix). However, differences for average number of goods sold in
Avoid (Effort: −0.67; Random: −0.53) are much larger than in Approach (Effort: 0.31;
Random: 0.25). Hence, the price discriminating store still experienced a net loss of
consumers. Looking only at the 78% who correctly answered the control question
does not change the results. We thus affirm that our main results are not dependent
on subjects’ failure to understand the implications for low-income consumers or a
wrong attribution of differential procedural treatment between consumers regarding
the variable of discrimination.
6.2 Robustness Check: Switching Costs
To assess the influence of switching costs on purchasing behavior, we opted for the
Avoid paradigm where subjects earned their endowment through the effort task and
had agency over the store’s future prices. We implemented three treatments with
switching costs of either 5, 15 or 30 Coins. From 125 independent observations per
treatment, we dropped 8, leaving us with 367 independent observations in total (54 %
female).
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Results
Results reveal moderate evidence for downward elasticity of consumer BPD aversions.
Increasing switching costs does not affect behavior (see Tables 5 and 9). For switching
costs of 5 Coins (5% of a participant’s endowment), the drop in average goods sold
after the introduction of price discounts was significantly higher than for switching
costs of 15 (−0.91 vs. −0.70; t = −1.71, p = 0.045) and weakly significantly higher
than for switching costs of 30 Coins (−0.91 vs. −0.74; t = −1.40, p = 0.082). There was
no difference between 15 and 30 Coins (t = 0.30, p = 0.619).11 Finally, the regression
analysis reveals no significant treatment dummy (Table 9), confirming that consumer
aversions towards BPD are relatively inelastic to changes in switching costs.





pro-pd in Approach self-interested
Salience
Avoid, Random 19.59 62.16
Approach, Random 10.00 65.33
Avoid, Effort 28.57 58.50
Approach, Effort 14.97 76.19
Switching costs
5 Coins 38.21 43.09
15 Coins 31.40 53.72
30 Coins 33.33 51.22
Note. Results are consistent with the main studies. Aversions towards BPD are substantially stronger
than respective support, and behavior is relatively inelastic to changes in switching costs.
6.3 Robustness Check: Consumer Reasoning
The post-experimental questionnaire of Studies 2, 4, and 5 included an open-ended
question that allowed participants to explain why they “did (not) decide to switch
11Restricting the sample to subjects who correctly answered the control question about consumer
purchases affecting store prices in a future HIT (75 %) amplifies these results for switching costs of
15 (5: −0.82 vs. 15: −0.51; t = −2.30, p = 0.011), but not for switching costs of 30 (5: −0.82 vs. 30:
−0.65; t = −1.23, p = 0.110).
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stores after [PD-Store] offered some consumers lower prices for the same good” in
their own words.12
First, the data largely confirmed the authenticity of subject feedback and thus vali-
dates the quality of our data. A large majority of participants offered straightforward
reasoning for their choices which demonstrated their understanding of the task, the
payoff scheme and the actors involved. Each participant wrote an average of 114
characters, and across all considered studies, only 136 out of 3229 stated reasons (4%)
were independently judged to be nonsensical.13
Second, subject answers confirmed that our interpretation of the two predominant
behavioral patterns as self-interested and anti-pd/pro-pd was overwhelmingly in line with
subject reasoning. From 590 identified reasons that were stated by subjects categorized
as anti-pd in Avoid, the majority (334) explicitly stated that they switched because they
were snubbed by the price-discriminating store. The second most cited reason was
that consumers wanted to punish the manager who introduced price discounts (73).
For the 1160 reasons from subjects labeled as self-interested in Avoid, the two main
recurring explanations were switching costs (444) and a lack of economic benefits
to switching (389). Thus, it appears that economic considerations disciplined many
consumers to abstain from inefficient switching. The analysis further highlighted that
a significant portion of consumers “silently” supported BPD (165), which could not be
captured by the Avoid paradigm. All these 165 subjects participated in studies where
consumers were able to influence the price setting in a future market and knew about
low-income consumers as well as income as the variable of discrimination (Study 4
and 5).
For Approach, the most prominent reason by subjects classified as pro-pd (104 iden-
tified reasons) was support for the price-discriminating store (51). Beyond that, 14
answers mentioned their agency over future prices as well as the option to equally
split manager profits over the four rounds. Consumers who stayed in the same store
over all rounds (880 reasons) predominantly mentioned that there were either no
benefits to switching (459), that switching was costly (225) or that they felt loyalty
towards the other store (66).
12To draw conclusions from these data, we opted for an inductive and manual coding scheme to
identify different response labels (coding framework). Further, we used the independent coder
method to heighten the reliability of our coding. Results from three coders were compared for
consistency and amended by the authors if needed.
13We extracted up to two reason from each subject’s answer. In case of two reasons, each received
equal weight in the analysis. For the full data set, please refer to the web appendix.
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Overall, the data supports our prior interpretations while underlining the impor-
tance of some crucial design choices like switching costs and the consideration of both
switching directions.
6.4 Demographics
Table 10 summarizes the results of a pooled ordered logistic regression containing
observations from all studies segregated by Avoid and Approach. Because differences in
the first two rounds were negligible, we concentrate on behavior after the introduction
of BPD in rounds three and four. Results show that BPD attitudes are mostly indepen-
dent from specific demographic variables. The main outliers are sex and individuals
with very high education. Subjects who identified as female were significantly more
likely to switch away from the price-discrimination store, whereas there is no differ-
ence for Approach. This is coherent with recent evidence suggesting that compared to
men, women are more likely to be inequity averters that prefer egalitarian pay, but less
likely to be surplus maximizers (Kamas and Preston 2015). The fact that there is no
such effect for Approach underscores that the decision to (not) costly reject something
is distinctly different from the decision to (not) costly support something. Apart from
that, reportedly out-of-work subjects as well as those with particularly high education
were more likely to stay within the same store and thereby maximize their payoff.
7 General Discussion
In this paper, we introduced the concept of benevolent price discrimination as a downward-
bound implementation of differential pricing that always benefits financially disadvan-
taged groups or individuals and thus leads to more equal economic outcomes while
no consumer incurs any losses. Across five studies, we show that a large share of
consumers rejects BPD and pays to switch to a competitor that treats all consumers
equally. Effects are the strongest when the benevolent nature of price discounts is
obfuscated. However, even when consumers know that everybody is priced according
to the same rule, and that differences in endowment are purely due to random chance,
the main results hold. This behavior is not driven by reciprocity, intentions, a lack
of transparency or a perception of merited outcome inequality. Costly support for
BPD is rare, and largely contingent on high levels of transparency as well as salient
agency over a store’s future prices. While consumers do move bidirectionally, net
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migration for the BPD-store is consistently negative. Thus, distributive fairness of
realized economic outcomes appears to play a relatively small role in determining
consumer reactions towards differential pricing.
Our results partially contrast well-researched phenomena from the literature on
social preferences and inequity aversion. First, there is good evidence to suggest
that consumers should be expected to support BPD as a less invasive analog to other
re-distributive policies. Second, many consumers do not differentiate whether pricing
equalizes outcome differences based on luck or based on merit, despite being similarly
salient as in other studies on social preferences relating to e.g. economic redistribution
(Alesina and Giuliano 2011), inequity aversion (Engelmann and Strobel 2004), the fair
process effect (Van den Bos, Vermunt, et al. 1997) or ultimatum bargaining (Camerer
2011). Under price discrimination, effects on the overall distribution of economic
welfare appear to be uniquely minuscule. Our results support the interpretation that
this is partially due to consumers being second movers and thus unable to ascribe
themselves agency. The introduction of a second period increases costly support
for BPD, while decreasing consumer aversion if income is allocated by a random
mechanism as opposed to an effort task. Hence, caring about other consumer’s payoff
appears to be partially dependent on one’s own direct influence. Put differently,
second-mover social preferences differ from first-mover social preferences.
One reason why price discrimination might elicit unique counter reaction lies in
people’s general aversion towards demand-driven pricing changes. We think that many
people neither judge prices, nor price-setting as something endogenously determined
by supply and demand, but rather something that should reflect the costs of a good.
This has also been proposed by Kahneman et al. (1986) in their seminal work on price
fairness perceptions. Setting different prices for the same good might be viewed as
uniquely undesirable by relatively adversely affected consumers, since (i) there is no
objective reason why prices should differ in any way and (ii) price discounts signal
that the “true” value of a product lies below what has been charged before.
Implications
While some studies have found that obfuscating interpersonal price differences reduces
consumer fairness concerns and thereby increases sellers’ pricing power (see e.g.
Allender et al. 2021), other researchers have suggested overt transparency to signal
benevolence if price discrimination is based on consumer income (Rotemberg 2011).
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Our results indicate that the latter is, by and large, not necessarily a good strategy
for sellers. At the very least, firms should expect a drop in demand by current
consumers, which could become quite large and almost certainly exceeds the attraction
of new consumers who would not benefit from price discounts. Given that price
discrimination in our study is downward-bound, further segmentation by increasing
prices would presumably culminate in even larger counter reactions. Instead, our
findings are more in line with results from Li and Jain (2016). Firms that are expecting
consumer fairness concerns reduce differential pricing, e.g. low poaching prices,
which reduces inefficient switching and consumer disutility from perceived price
unfairness, but hurts overall consumer surplus. Thus, consumer reactions induce
constraints for price interventions that increase market participation as well as joint
welfare. We conclude that seller hesitation to deviate from uniform pricing appears to
be a well-adapted strategic reaction towards substantial behavioral constraints that
cannot be alleviated by equalizing unequal outcome distributions and transparently
targeting low-income consumers.
Limitations and Future Research
Our results support the conjunction that contextual and procedural elements inherent
to the price setting framework play a considerable role for consumer behavior and, in
our setting, clearly outweigh outcome-related reasoning. Nevertheless, contextual and
procedural elements may naturally differ between markets or even be strategically
influenced by sellers, possibly tipping the scales in favor of outcome-related reasoning.
For instance, our results cannot explain the widely observed acceptance of price
discounts for specific low-income groups. Since the experiments were explicitly
designed to be context-neutral, effects elicited by e.g. social norms, cultural norms,
inertia or habituation are beyond the scope of this paper. They might, however,
moderate the influence of outcome reasoning on consumer behavior. It is also possible
that people are more accepting of different prices for population groups they (i) have
been part of in the past (e.g. people below 25) or (ii) will be part of in the future (e.g.
people above 65).
One explanation for our results may be that consumers expect prices to correlate
with costs, which is violated by demand-based price discrimination. If that is the
case, the introduction of price increases for high-income consumers might counter-
intuitively reduce behavioral constraints to price discrimination, because they signal a
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potential necessity to compensate price discounts, rather than relatively large profit
margins at the original price. One hidden implication is that consumers could react
differently to price discrimination over physical products than price discrimination
over services. Presumably, it is much harder to define the “true” value of a service than
that of a product, as the former’s cost function more saliently captures intangibles like
opportunity costs, rather than costs of production. This question, however, requires a
less abstract approach to the quantification of consumer behavior.
Finally, we were able to identify consumers’ agency over prices and thereby out-
comes, as one relevant procedural element that interacts with outcome-driven behav-
ioral changes. Although consumers’ agency was already quite salient in our study,
there may be other interventions that are more effective in increasing perceptions of
agency. First, a logical extension of our setup is to implement a multi-round dynamic
market environment in which consumers can “experience” their agency over market
outcomes. Other interventions may increase agency by involving consumers more
directly in the price setting process, e.g. by some form of voluntary extra payment
or “Pay-as-You-Wish” pricing (Chen et al. 2017). Here, we hope that our results
help future researchers in exploring innovative pricing mechanisms that better fit the
social and economic preferences of consumers while avoiding the pitfalls of antago-
nizing consumers against one another. Consumer social and fairness preferences are
a demonstrably complicated phenomenon, influenced by a multitude of procedural
and distributive variables, that often translate into non-obvious behavioral patterns.
Without careful considerations, instruments of differential pricing might provoke con-
sumer reactions with at least ambiguous, if not outright negative welfare effects. An
increasing public recognition of price discrimination could be detrimental to consumer
welfare, which should caution policy calls for more transparency.
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Appendix
Table 6 — Consumer attitudes by experimental condition (Study 4, Avoid)
By experimental condition
Experimental condition
Short description of questionnaire item
Agency No agency Diff.
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t-stat.
Effort
Fairness of PD1 3.79 (1.96) 3.41 (1.90) 1.68*
Fairness of punishment by switching2 5.21 (1.68) 5.03 (1.87) 0.89
Good intentions of PD manager3 4.24 (1.78) 4.19 (1.97) 0.23
Bad intentions of PD manager4 3.65 (1.84) 3.75 (2.04) −0.44
Exploitation by PD manager5 3.66 (2.00) 3.47 (2.08) 0.81
Feel exploited by PD manager6 3.82 (2.07) 3.90 (2.07) −0.35
SCO7 4.52 (1.24) 4.47 (1.11) 0.34
Random
Fairness of PD1 4.26 (1.88) 4.26 (2.07) 0.00
Fairness of punishment by switching2 4.78 (1.81) 4.91 (1.97) −0.57
Good intentions of PD manager3 4.62 (1.75) 4.75 (1.80) −0.63
Bad intentions of PD manager4 3.30 (1.83) 3.09 (1.91) 0.99
Exploitation by PD manager5 3.55 (1.95) 3.26 (2.09) 1.26
Feel exploited by PD manager6 3.72 (1.99) 3.68 (2.18) 0.16
SCO7 4.70 (1.05) 4.33 (1.19) 2.81***
Note. All questions were answered on a 7-point scale. Superscript 1: 1 (unfair) to 7 (fair). Superscripts
2–4: 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Superscript 5: 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much); 1“Please
rate how fair you think it is that manager A/B decided to offer consumers who [Effort: earned a
lower endowment in the slider task, Random: randomly received a lower endowment] lower prices
for the same good.”, 2“The more goods a store sells, the higher the income of the participant acting
as its manager. Do you consider it fair to switch from Store A/B to Store B/A in order to reduce
manager A/B’s profit because of their pricing strategy?”, 3“Manager A/B’s intention for [Intention:
introducing interpersonal price differences; No intention: choosing the pricing algorithm] was good.”,
4Wording is equal to row 2, except last word is “bad”, 5“Manager A/B intended to take advantage of
me (the consumer).”, 6“The fact that [Intention: Manager A/B, No intention: Store A/B’s algorithm]
decided to offer some consumers lower prices makes me feel taken advantage of.”, 7Mean of Social
comparison orientation scale by Gibbons and Buunk (1999); The reported t-statistic results from a
two-sample mean-comparison t-tests by behavioral pattern; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 7 — Consumer attitudes by experimental condition (Study 4, Approach)
By experimental condition
Experimental condition
Short description of questionnaire item
Agency No agency Diff.
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t-stat.
Effort
Fairness of PD1 3.94 (2.02) 4.03 (1.88) −0.42
Fairness of switching to increase profit2 4.71 (1.65) 4.55 (1.79) 0.82
Good intentions of PD manager3 4.50 (1.66) 4.57 (1.66) −0.40
Bad intentions of PD manager4 3.52 (1.84) 3.28 (1.71) 1.16
Exploitation by PD manager5 3.32 (1.82) 2.93 (1.79) 1.86*
Feel exploited by PD manager6 3.91 (2.02) 3.25 (1.91) 2.90***
SCO7 4.67 (1.08) 4.63 (1.11) 0.29
Random
Fairness of PD1 4.42 (1.84) 4.66 (1.85) −1.11
Fairness of switching to increase profit2 4.66 (1.77) 4.50 (1.69) 0.78
Good intentions of PD manager3 4.79 (1.55) 4.93 (1.60) −0.78
Bad intentions of PD manager4 3.10 (1.66) 2.97 (1.70) 0.70
Exploitation by PD manager5 3.25 (1.81) 2.81 (1.80) 2.11**
Feel exploited by PD manager6 3.66 (1.87) 3.30 (1.90) 1.64
SCO7 4.66 (1.09) 4.66 (1.17) −0.02
Note. All questions were answered on a 7-point scale. Superscript 1: 1 (unfair) to 7 (fair). Superscripts
2–4: 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Superscript 5: 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much); 1“Please
rate how fair you think it is that manager A/B decided to offer consumers who [Effort: earned a
lower endowment in the slider task, Random: randomly received a lower endowment] lower prices
for the same good.”, 2“The more goods a store sells, the higher the income of the participant acting
as its manager. Do you consider it fair to switch from Store A/B to Store B/A in order to reduce
manager A/B’s profit because of their pricing strategy?”, 3“Manager A/B’s intention for [Intention:
introducing interpersonal price differences; No intention: choosing the pricing algorithm] was good.”,
4Wording is equal to row 2, except last word is “bad”, 5“Manager A/B intended to take advantage of
me (the consumer).”, 6“The fact that [Intention: Manager A/B, No intention: Store A/B’s algorithm]
decided to offer some consumers lower prices makes me feel taken advantage of.”, 7Mean of Social
comparison orientation scale by Gibbons and Buunk (1999); The reported t-statistic results from a
two-sample mean-comparison t-tests by behavioral pattern; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 8 — Panel logistic regression using random effects for Approach









PD 0.636 0.409 0.120 1.689***
(0.666) (0.586) (0.437) (0.411)
PD × Effort 0.184 0.026 1.619**
(0.774) (0.654) (0.770)
PD × Agency 1.923***
(0.650)
PD × Effort × Agency −0.258
(0.913)




Effort × Agency 0.527
(0.709)
SCO −0.308 −0.076 −0.064 0.410**
(0.239) (0.193) (0.121) (0.193)
Constant −2.731** −3.709*** −3.420*** −6.070***
(1.229) (1.037) (0.675) (1.140)
N 388 800 2356 1188
AIC 153.150 381.708 1246.513 728.275
BIC 168.994 409.816 1304.160 758.755
Note. Table reports results of panel logistic regressions using random effects and a cluster–robust
VCE estimator. Dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if participant bought a good in
the price discriminating store, 0 otherwise — Independent variables: “PD” equals 1 in Round 2 and
3, 0 otherwise; Effort and Agency are dummy variables for the experimental conditions; Reference
groups are omitted from the table; “SCO” is mean of Social comparison orientation scale by Gibbons
and Buunk (1999) — * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 10 — Ordered logistic regression over all studies by Approach
Avoid Approach
Coef. se Coef. se
Year of birth 0.008* (0.005) 0.034*** (0.010)
Gender
Male Reference group
Female −0.306*** (0.097) 0.141 (0.174)
Prefer not to answer −0.259 (0.533) 1.270 (1.005)
Employment status
Working (paid employee) Reference group
Working (self-employed) 0.090 (0.137) −0.031 (0.276)
Not working (temporary layoff) −0.099 (0.517) −0.216 (0.436)
Not working (looking for work) −0.005 (0.177) 0.372 (0.266)
Not working (retired) 0.649** (0.313) 0.973 (0.593)
Not working (disabled) 0.299 (0.334) −0.527 (1.148)
Not working (other) 0.285 (0.180) −0.294 (0.312)
Prefer not to answer 0.006 (0.371) −13.237*** (0.437)
Education
Less than high school degree 0.063 (0.957) 0.065 (1.246)
High school graduate 0.071 (0.169) −0.147 (0.344)
Some college but no degree −0.186 (0.120) −0.267 (0.234)
Associate degree in college (2-year) −0.242 (0.172) −0.600* (0.358)
Bachelor’s degree in college (4-year) Reference group
Master’s degree 0.516*** (0.144) 0.086 (0.251)
Doctoral degree 1.311*** (0.413) −0.382 (0.700)
Professional degree (JD, MD) −0.005 (0.324) 0.342 (0.542)
Social Comparison Orientation Scale
Item 1 0.041 (0.035) −0.045 (0.064)
Item 2 −0.039 (0.043) 0.057 (0.078)
Item 3 0.027 (0.045) −0.008 (0.085)
Item 4 0.008 (0.042) −0.125* (0.073)
Item 5 −0.101*** (0.037) 0.088 (0.077)
Item 6 0.047 (0.043) 0.072 (0.091)
Item 7 0.040 (0.044) 0.112 (0.080)
Item 8 0.049 (0.054) −0.004 (0.108)
Item 9 −0.044 (0.052) −0.180 (0.113)
Item 10 −0.075* (0.044) 0.016 (0.089)
Item 11 0.009 (0.033) 0.020 (0.062)
Ethnicity
African American 0.185 (0.211) 0.343 (0.411)
continued
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Table 10 — continued
Avoid Approach
Coef. se Coef. se
American Indian 0.265 (0.466) 1.063* (0.614)
Asian 0.480** (0.221) −0.949* (0.497)
Hispanic/Latino 0.032 (0.221) −0.021 (0.387)
White/Caucasian 0.379* (0.199) 0.067 (0.395)




Note. Table reports results of ordered logistic regressions using a robust VCE estimator. Dependent
variable is the number of goods sold in the PD store in rounds 3 and 4 — Reference groups of inde-
pendent variables are omitted; Items of social comparison orientation scale by Gibbons and Buunk
(1999): Item 1: “I often compare how my loved ones (boy or girlfriend, family members, etc.) are do-
ing with how others are doing”, Item 2: “I always pay a lot of attention to how I do things compared
with how others do things”, Item 3: “If I want to find out how well I have done something, I compare
what I have done with how others have done”, Item 4: “I often compare how I am doing socially
(e.g., social skills, popularity) with other people”, Item 5: “I am not the type of person who compares
often with others” (reverse coded), Item 6: “I often compare myself with others with respect to what
I have accomplished in life”, Item 7: “I often like to talk with others about mutual opinions and expe-
riences”, Item 8: “I often try to find out what others think who face similar problems as I face”, Item
9: “I always like to know what others in a similar situation would do”, Item 10: “If I want to learn
more about something, I try to find out what others think about it”, Item 11: “I never consider my
situation in life relative to that of other people.” (reverse coded) — * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

chapter iii
Excusing selfish behavior with (willfully induced)
uncertainty: An experimental study
Mattheus Brenig, Nils Engelbrecht, and Daniel Hermann
In most decisions, the causal relationship between one’s actions and the consequences
for others is subject to uncertainty. We examine how uncertainty due to moves of
nature affects selfish behavior in a decision that involves a trade-off between one’s
own and others’ payoff. We consider three specific excuses for selfish behavior
associated with uncertainty: A diffusion of being pivotal, the bystander excuse, and
the replacement excuse. The replacement excuse can be used when there is uncertainty
about whether an unselfish decision prevents the externality. The bystander excuse
can be used when there is uncertainty about whether a selfish decision results in the
externality. We extend our analysis of excuse-driven behavior by varying the scope
of uncertainty and introducing the opportunity for willful ignorance. We find that
introducing uncertainty increases selfish behavior by approximately one-fourth. This
result is robust to our experimental variations of pivotality, the scope of uncertainty,
and possibilities to invoke the bystander and/or replacement excuses. Once pivotality
is reduced to zero, selfish behavior increases further. Two-thirds of subjects disclose
information about their influence on the externality, resulting in no significant effect
when willful ignorance is allowed for.
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1 Introduction
In his seminal work on moral disengagement, Bandura (1999) identifies several psycho-
social mechanisms that decision-makers use to justify harmful effects of their actions
on others. These mechanisms include denial of personal agency through diffusion
of responsibility, as well as consciously ignoring effects on others. While Bandura
mainly applies his theory to war crimes and military atrocities, it also appears to
apply to decisions involving more mundane trade-offs between self and others, such
as everyday market transactions. Although each individual market transaction may
lead to comparatively small harmful effects, the ubiquity of markets, combined with
extensive division of labor can lead to a wide diffusion of responsibility and increased
opportunities for willful ignorance, allowing for moral disengagement on both sides
of the market and substantial aggregate effects.
Consider climate change. Because climate is a global public good, responsibility
is maximally diffused and each consumer or producer may justify selfish behavior
with a negligible impact on the outcome. Moreover, sociological studies show that
diffused responsibility is accompanied by a reluctance to learn about climate change
(Stoll-Kleemann et al. 2001; Norgaard 2006). Diffusion of responsibility also seems
to apply in markets with fewer participants, like the arms trade market. Tony Blair,
then prime minister of the United Kingdom (UK), in a 2002 press conference used the
prospect of replacement by market competitors and the resulting uncertainty about
the UK’s ability to prevent military atrocities as an excuse not to restrict UK’s arms
industry and risk jobs.1
More rigorous evidence on moral disengagement in markets comes from an emerg-
ing strand of economic research that indicates that decision-makers are more selfish
once the relationship between their actions and others’ consequences is blurred through
e.g. (i) delegating tasks to agents (Hamman et al. 2010; Bartling and Fischbacher 2012),
(ii) responsibility diffusion when outcomes depend on the interaction of multiple
persons (Brütt et al. 2020; Falk et al. 2020; Ziegler et al. 2021; Falk and Szech 2013),
and (iii) willful ignorance (Bartling et al. 2014; Grossman and Weele 2016; Reczek
et al. 2018). All these examples introduce ex-ante uncertainty about the consequences
of one’s actions on others. This allows decision-makers to justify selfish behavior
1“If we want to stop the defence industry operating in this country we can do so, and the result inci-
dentally will be that someone else supplies the arms that we supply, [. . . ]”; see https://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100105173918/http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3000.
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and avoid attribution of blame and responsibility not only by themselves, but also
by others (e.g. Bartling and Fischbacher 2012; Coffman 2011). Dana et al. (2007) have
fittingly described such behavior as exploiting “moral wiggle room”.
This study contributes to the aforementioned literature, by investigating how dif-
ferent excuses emanating from uncertainty about ex-ante causal responsibility for a
negative externality suffered by third parties influence selfish behavior. In addition, we
are interested in whether, once uncertainty is introduced, the ability of decision-makers
to remain ignorant of the consequences for third parties leads to further increase in
selfishness.
We consider the interplay of three specific excuses for selfish behavior associated
with uncertainty: A diffusion of being pivotal, the bystander excuse and the replace-
ment excuse. The extent of (ex-ante) diffusion of being pivotal can be described as the
weight of an individual’s decision on the externality, i.e., how much the probability
of the externality is affected by an individual’s decision (Engl 2018). At the extremes,
subjects are either fully pivotal or not pivotal at all. In the first case, there is no moral
wiggle room, since a selfish decision leads to the externality with certainty. In the
second case, subjects have no influence at all and only individuals following a deonto-
logical moral reasoning would still refrain from choosing the selfish option (Falk et al.
2020). In the intermediate case, with ex-ante uncertainty, subjects can use the bystander
and/or replacement excuse. The replacement excuse can be applied when there is
uncertainty as to whether an unselfish decision prevents the externality. For example,
market participants may cause an externality with certainty if they participate in a
transaction, but they can use the excuse “if I don’t make the transactions, someone
else will” to justify their behavior (Falk et al. 2020; Ziegler et al. 2021). The bystander
excuse can be applied when there is uncertainty as to whether a selfish decision results
in the externality. For example, a bystander can help a victim and prevent harm with
certainty, but may rely on other bystanders to respond to the emergency (Darley and
Latane 1968; Fischer et al. 2011). In the above examples, the uncertainty is associated
with only one choice option and therefore the excuses do not occur together. However,
both excuses can occur simultaneously. To stick with the market analogy: In terms of
a consumer’s influence on future market outcomes, uncertainty is probably prevalent
in both the selfish and unselfish choice option.
Subjects in our experiment make a decision in a non-strategic environment where
they can either maximize their own payoff or forgo some of it. Depending on subjects
ex-ante causal responsibility, forgoing payoff may or may not prevent a negative
78 excusing selfish behavior with (willfully induced) uncertainty
externality for third parties. While this describes our experimental design in abstract
terms, the details replicate basic aspects of market transactions, as outlined in Section
2. Our design is motivated by how consumers perceive their causal responsibility
for externalities triggered by market transactions. Moreover, in introducing strategic
ignorance, we closely mirror how consumers in markets retrieve information, e.g.,
via product labels, just before making a purchase. Our analysis is conducted in three
steps. First, we vary the ex-ante uncertainty regarding the consequences of a subject’s
choice on the externality along two properties. The first property is the pivotality of
the subject, i.e. by how much the probability of the externality increases with a selfish
choice. The second property is the “inherent” probability of the externality, which
is independent of the subject’s choice. Based on these two properties, we can vary
a subjects pivotality and whether the replacement and/or bystander excuse can be
applied.2 Second, we extend the analysis by restricting the scope of uncertainty to only
half of the externality, while subjects can prevent the other half with certainty. As
subjects are now fully pivotal for part of the externality, this may limit their ability
to use excuses and thus reduce selfish behavior. That is, subjects can never justify
that the ex-post outcome will be the same, independent of their behavior. Third, we
add the possibility of strategic ignorance in both aforementioned decision regimes.
We expect that the possibility of willful ignorance in and of itself increases selfish
behavior. However, depending on how excuse-driven behavior works, adding further
justifications may only lead to a small increase in selfishness.
Our study is closely related to economic experiments in which unanimous group
decisions are required to either cause or prevent an externality. In Falk et al. (2020)
and Brütt et al. (2020), groups need a unanimous vote to prevent a negative externality.
In Hauser et al. (2014), a single group member can exploit a common-pool resource to
the point that it is not replenished for future generations. Since a single selfish vote or
choice is sufficient to cause the negative externality, the ex-ante probability of each
individual being pivotal is reduced. Similarly, in the multi-unit market treatment in
Ziegler et al. (2021), one buyer-seller pair can trade all available units in a market,
leading to the largest possible negative externality. In all the above-mentioned studies,
subjects can use the replacement excuse to justify selfish behavior. Other studies have
investigated unanimity voting in favor of a negative externality (Dana et al. 2007;
2In our paper, we use the term uncertainty as a synonym for risk, i.e. a known probability distribution
over a range of known outcomes. If either probabilities or outcomes are unknown, we use the term
ambiguity.
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Irlenbusch and Saxler 2019; Behnk et al. 2017). Here, subjects can apply the bystander
excuse. Irrespective of whether individuals can veto in favor or against the selfish
outcome, studies find increased selfishness compared to individual decision making,
i.e. with maximum pivotality. Brütt et al. (2020) compare both types of veto rights and
find no significant difference in selfishness.
We contribute to this literature in various ways. First, we replace uncertainty
through the behavior of other decision-makers by moves of nature. This allows us to
manipulate uncertainty in a more fine-grained and controlled manner, while holding
other dimensions of responsibility diffusion constant like shared guilt (Rothenhäusler
et al. 2018) or information on social norms. In particular, for group decisions, percep-
tion of uncertainty depends on individuals’ endogenous beliefs about the behavior of
other group members and is thus the result of “fuzzy” probabilistic reasoning. The
formation of belief is difficult to control and does not lend itself to precise manip-
ulation through experimental treatments. We further contribute to the literature by
considering different combinations of excuses and different degrees of being pivotal.
Most situations, unlike unanimous votes, have uncertain consequences regardless
of an individual’s decision. In such situations, decision-makers can combine both
the replacement and bystander excuse. We further test excuse-driven behavior by
restricting the scope of uncertainty such that subjects can always prevent part of
the externality and therefore never justify that the ex-post outcome will be the same
independent of their behavior. Finally, we examine whether decisions are sensitive to
the possibility to ignore consequences for third parties.
2 Experimental design
2.1 Setting
Subjects participate in groups of five in an ultimatum bargaining situation in which
there are three roles: proposers (A), responders (B), and inactive third parties (C). In
each group, there are two proposers A1 and A2, two inactive third parties C1 and C2,
and one responder B. Each proposer is assigned one inactive third party. The game
is played for 2 rounds. Both rounds are relevant for payoffs. The group composition
is fixed over both rounds. In each round, all subjects first receive an endowment of
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a = b = c = 100 coins.3 As explained in more detail below, proposers and responders
have varying degrees of influence over the final distribution of coins in each round.
In round one, each proposer is first given a binary choice between offering the
responder a distribution of either (ai = 110, b = 120, ci = 70) or (ai = 110, b =
110, ci = 100) coins. For both possible offers, the sum of the payments that proposer
and responder receive is 30 or 20 coins greater than the sum of their initial endowments
of 100 coins each. However, one distribution does not affect the inactive third party’s
endowment, while the other entails a loss of 30 coins. Throughout this paper, we
will refer to the first and the second offer as selfish and unselfish, respectively. In
the instructions, we used the neutral terms A and B and the colors blue and red to
differentiate the offers.4 Matching of proposers and responders only takes place after
the first stage of round one is implemented, and is not random. Instead, groups
are matched in a way that each responder can choose between both, the unselfish
and selfish offer.5 The responder has to accept one of the two offers. Thereby, the
final allocation of coins to all group members is determined. The responder and the
“winning” proposer receive the coins associated with the accepted offer. The “losing”
proposer keeps the initial endowment of 100 coins. The determination of the payoffs
for the inactive third parties depends on the experimental condition, as explained
below.
The process of round two is identical to round one, except that offers are no longer
chosen by proposers. Instead, offers depend on a move of nature in which the
probabilities of future offers depend on the choice of the responder. The parameters
of the move of nature depend on the experimental condition, as explained below.
Independent of the specific parameter values, the move of nature leads to either two
selfish or unselfish offers.
3Throughout the study, we used the term “coins” for our experimental currency, with a conversion
rate of 100 coins to $1.
4We randomized both colors, to control for possible color preferences.
5Responders are not informed about this detail of the matching process. However, it is important
to emphasize that no deception is involved. To control for possible positional preferences on the




While offers in round one are chosen by proposers, the offers in round two are
determined by a move of nature. The move leads to one of two possible “market
structures” in round two: a market where both proposers make the selfish or unselfish
offer. We call the former the selfish and and latter the unselfish market. The move of
nature is determined by the two parameters 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. The parameter
α determines the pivotality or weight of the responder’s choice in terms of how much
the probability of a selfish market is increased if the responder accepts the selfish
offer. Weighted with (1 − α), the parameter β determines the inherent probability of
the externality. For example if α = 0.1 and β = 0.5, the inherent probability of the
externality is 45 % = (1− 0.1)× 0.5× 100, and a selfish choice increases the probability
by 10 percentage points to 55 %.
Round one and two in extensive form are represented by Figure 1.6 In reading the
game tree, remember that groups are matched so that both the unselfish and selfish
offer are available to the responder in round one. Hence, if a responder accepts a
selfish offer by e.g. A1, an unselfish offer by A2 is rejected and vice versa. Due to this
symmetry, only half of the game tree is shown in detail. If α equals 1, the value of β
is irrelevant and the responder is solely responsible for the market structure. If the
responder chooses the selfish offer in round one, the market will be selfish in round
two. The opposite is true for α = 0. In this case, the responder has no influence on
the market structure in round two. For any 0 < α < 1, varying β effects whether the
responder can apply the replacement and/or bystander excuse. If β equals 1, there is
uncertainty as to whether an unselfish decision prevents the externality (replacement
excuse). If β equals 0, there is uncertainty as to whether a selfish decision results in
the externality (bystander excuse). In the intermediate case of 0 < β < 1, both choice
options are subject to uncertainty, which is why both excuses can be used.
Scope of uncertainty
Proposers’ and responder’s payoffs are always determined once the responder accepts
an offer. The timing of the payoff consequences for third parties, on the other hand,
6Payoffs are not shown and can be deduced from Figure 2. Instead, the game tree is intended to show
which path of the decision tree leads to which market structure.
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Figure 1 — Game tree over both rounds
depends on the experimental condition. This applies to both rounds, regardless of
whether the proposer has actively selected the offer (round one) or whether the offer
for the proposer was determined by the market rule (round two). Analogous to the
Made-to-Stock (MTS) and Made-to-Order (MTO) manufacturing processes, pivotality
for externalities of offers that have already been made is implemented as a binary
variable, i.e., responders are either pivotal or not.7 In MTO, a negative externality
arises by consumption. In MTS all the injustices associated with the production
process have already occurred once a product is offered to consumers. Experimental
studies on socially responsible behavior in markets have applied either MTO or MTS
(e.g., MTO in Bartling et al. 2015 and MTS in Pigors and Rockenbach 2016). In MTS, a
third party payoff is determined as soon as the assigned proposer chooses the offer. In
MTO, all payoffs are determined once the responder accepts an offer. Hence, while
responders cannot prevent the externality by rejecting the selfish offer in MTS, they
can do so in MTO. Round one in extensive form is represented by Figure 2 for MTO
and MTS. The payoffs associated with the “winning” offer are highlighted by a box.
Importantly, MTO splits the avoidable externality over both rounds. If a responder
accepts the selfish offer in round one, 30 coins of externality are created. When the
selfish market occurs in round two, two selfish offers are made, but only 30 coins
7Traditionally, goods are produced ahead, i.e. made-to-stock (MTS). However, due to new production
technologies and more differentiated consumer demand, goods are increasingly made-to-order
(MTO). While MTO was predominantly used for complex and highly customized products such as
industrial machines or cars, it is now applied to mass products such as clothes or even groceries
(Gilmore and Pine 1997; Holweg and Pil 2001).
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of externality are created by consumption. In contrast, all avoidable externalities in
MTS are realized in round two. When round two is the selfish market, two selfish
offers are made, resulting in 60 coins of externality regardless of responder choice
in round two. Because the move of nature only applies to offers in round two, the
scope of uncertainty is reduced by half in MTO. Because this experimental condition
depends on subjects understanding the consequences of their choices on payoffs, we
included three comprehension questions that asked about all relevant payoffs for a
selfish choice in round one and the payoffs for both round two scenarios (see Online
Appendix A.5 for all comprehension questions).
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Figure 2 — Game tree for round 1
Strategic ignorance
In the Full information condition, subjects are informed about the payoff consequences
for all roles in the instructions and their understanding of these consequences is tested
with several comprehension questions. In the Strategic ignorance condition, payoff
consequences for third parties are hidden from the subjects in the instructions. That is,
subjects do not know the direction or magnitude of the payoff consequences. However,
subjects are informed that they have the opportunity to reveal the payoff consequences
before making a decision. To reveal the information, subjects only have to click a
button on the screen, i.e. there are no transaction costs.
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2.3 Treatments and behavioral hypotheses
Table 1 gives an overview of the treatments. In the first step of our analysis, we
investigate behavior in MTS, i.e. when the externality of 60 coins is realized in round
two and therefore in its entirety subject to the move of nature.
Table 1 — Treatments
Experimental setup
Pivotality Inherent probability MTO/MTS Strategic ignorance
Name α (1 − α)× β
Baseline 100 0 MTS No
Bystander 50 0 MTS No
Replacement 50 50 MTS No
Compound 10 45 MTS No
Deontological 0 50 MTS No
CompoundMTO 10 45 MTO No
BaselineMTO 100 0 MTO No
Compound* 10 45 MTS Yes
CompoundMTO* 10 45 MTO Yes
We hypothesize that selfishness increases in the order of treatments as shown in
the first section of Table 1, i.e. rows one to five. In our Baseline condition, subjects are
maximally pivotal, i.e. a selfish choice leads to the externality with certainty and vice
versa. In this case, there is no moral wiggle room. In our Replacement condition, we
set the inherent probability of the externality and pivotality to fifty percentage points.
A selfish choice leads to the externality with certainty, while there is a fifty percent
probability of the externality even if the subject is not selfish. Although pivotality is
still relatively high, subjects may use the uncertainty regarding their ability to prevent
the externality as an excuse for selfishness. In our Bystander condition, the intrinsic
probability corresponds to zero and pivotality to fifty percentage points. In this case,
subjects can prevent the externality. However, they can excuse selfish behavior on
the grounds that there is a chance that the externality will be prevented either way.
Pivotality is equally strong in Bystander and Replacement, the only difference being
the inherent probability of the externality. This is analog to unanimity voting in favor
(Bystander) or against (Replacement) the externality. To our knowledge, only Brütt
et al. (2020) compare both types of voting. They find slightly lower selfishness in a
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bystander-like situation, but no significant differences. In our Compound condition, we
set the inherent probability to forty-five and pivotality to ten percentage points. In
Compound, pivotality is reduced substantially and subjects can apply both the bystander
and replacement excuse. Accordingly, we expect increased selfishness compared
to Bystander and Replacement. Finally, in Deontological, the inherent probability is
fifty percent and subjects have no influence on the market at all. In this scenario,
only individuals following a deontological moral reasoning would still refrain from
choosing the selfish option (Falk et al. 2020).
Hypothesis 1 Selfishness is lowest in Baseline and largest in Deontological. The treatments
Bystander, Replacement, and Compound lie in-between, the latter exhibiting relatively
strong selfish behavior.
In step two, we extent our main analysis by investigating behavior in MTO. In
this choice setting, subjects always generate half of the externality, i.e. 30 coins, by
choosing the selfish offer in round one. If round two is a selfish market, another
30 coins of externality arise by consumption. Essentially, the move of nature now
only applies to half of the externality, while subjects can prevent the other half with
certainty. That is, subjects can never justify that the ex-post outcome will be the same,
independent of their behavior. We chose the Compound condition for the MTO setting,
because it generates the largest difference between MTO and MTS in terms of expected
externality, while allowing for the largest number of excuses due to low pivotality as
well as the bystander and replacement excuse. We call this treatment CompoundMTO.
Hypothesis 2 Selfish behavior is lower in CompoundMTO compared to Compound.
Furthermore, as a control, we also run a BaselineMTO treatment with full pivotality.
For the purpose of our study, we are only interested in the differences between MTO
and MTS in terms of the scope of uncertainty. However, there may be a concern
that the two conditions introduce other differences that are relevant to behavior. For
example, simply by framing the timing of the externality differently, subjects may
feel like second movers in MTS and, as a result, less responsible for the externality.
At full pivotality, there is no uncertainty and thus no difference between MTO and
MTS on the dimension of interest for our study. In both treatments, subjects have full
pivotality for 60 coins of externality. Comparing Baseline and BaselineMTO thus serves
as a control for potential confounds due to unintended changes.
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In a third and last step, we allow for strategic ignorance in both CompoundMTO and
Compound. Ceteris paribus, giving subjects the opportunity to remain strategically
ignorant about the consequences of their decisions on third parties should increase
selfishness.
Hypothesis 3 Selfishness is higher in CompoundMTO* and Compound*, compared to
CompoundMTO and Compound, respectively.
2.4 Experimental procedures
The experiment was programmed with oTree (Chen et al. 2016) and administered to
subjects via MTurk between December 2020 and February 2021. We prevented retakes
and restricted participation to US residents.8 Since we were only interested in the
responder decisions and needed to ensure that both offers were made in each group,
we collected the proposer and third party observations beforehand. We applied a
many-to-one matching, collecting at least one selfish and unselfish proposer and two
third party observations per treatment. These participants received a fixed payment
immediately, and (if matched) the rest of their payment after all responder observations
were collected.
In total, 1,130 subjects in the role of responder participated. After reading a plain
language statement and giving consent to participate, subjects read the instructions
(see Online Appendix A.4) and had a maximum of two attempts to answer a few
comprehension questions correctly. Subjects who failed twice were excluded from
participation. We performed two additional tests to check the validity of our ex-
perimental design and subjects’ understanding of the experiment and instructions
(see Online Appendix A.2). After completion of the main task, subjects completed a
post-experimental questionnaire. Following our preregistration and based on arrival
time, we excluded observations in excess of 125 observations per treatment. Our
final sample thus comprises 1125 observations. About 49 % of subjects were female.
Participants are on average 36 years old. For more information on participants’ socio-
demographics, see Online Appendix A.1. Participants took an average of 21 minutes,
with a mean payment of $3.05, which equals $13.30 per hour.9
8In addition, due to readability issues, we excluded participants who reported accessing the study via
smartphone or tablet.
9We preregistered the experiment at https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=be7c8c. The complete




Figure 3 shows the share of selfish choices per treatment in MTS and Full information.
As expected, subjects are least selfish in Baseline (48.8 %), with deterministic influence
on second-round offers. Once uncertainty is introduced, selfish behavior increases
about ten percentage points to 58.4 %, 59.2 %, and 60 %. This increase is on the
borderline to significance in a pairwise comparison (chi2-test, p = 0.13, 0.10, and 0.08).
There is no significant difference (chi2-test, p = 0.967) among the three treatments
with uncertainty. That is, it does not seem to matter for selfish behavior whether
uncertainty allows subjects to use either the replacement or bystander excuse. Even
more surprisingly, reducing pivotality from 50 % to 10 % does not significantly increase
selfishness either. However, subjects do seem to differentiate between uncertain causal
responsibility and no causality at all. Once responders have no influence on the market
in Deontological, selfishness increases to 72 %. This increase is significant with respect to
all other treatments in a pairwise comparison (chi2-test, p = 0.05, 0.03, 0.02, and 0.00).
The treatment Deontological also reveals that 28 % of responders still reject the selfish
offer, which may be due to deontological reasons or to punish the proposer.











Figure 3 — Share of selfish choices in treatments
Result 1 Introducing uncertainty about a responder’s influence on future market outcomes
increases selfish behavior.
Result 2 Subjects behavior seems to be inelastic to changes in pivotality and different combi-
nations of the replacement and bystander excuse.
additional information about the data structure can be accessed via the following repository:
https://osf.io/md7wu/?view_only=02fe724834be413d8ef84370adb20f97.
88 excusing selfish behavior with (willfully induced) uncertainty
Result 3 Selfish behavior is highest in Deontological. Still, 28 % of responders reject the
selfish offer.
Similar to the different excuses relating to uncertainty, reducing its scope from
Compound to CompoundMTO does not impact behavior significantly. Despite the
possibility to prevent half of the externality with certainty and therefore considerable
differences in aggregate pivotality, selfish behavior only decreases slightly to 58.4 %,
i.e. by 1.6 percentage points. Concordantly, a Pearson’s χ2 test is not significant
(p = 0.8). A comparison of Baseline (48.8 %) and BaselineMTO (47.2 %) shows that there
are no other confounding differences between MTS and MTO.
Result 4 Reducing the scope of uncertainty by half does not significantly affect selfish behavior.
Allowing responders to remain ignorant about the consequences of their decisions
on third parties does not significantly affect selfish behavior in our experiment. While
selfishness increases in MTS as expected (from 60 % to 63.2 %), there is a comparable
decrease in MTO (from 58.4 % to 54.4 %). About two-third of subjects chose to reveal
the payoff consequences for third parties, in both MTO (68.80 %) and MTS (61.60 %).
This difference is not statistically significant (χ2 = 1.43, p = 0.23). Subjects who
actively disclose the payoff information are less likely to choose the selfish offer than
subjects who get (passively) informed in the instructions. In MTO the difference is
16.54 percentage points (41.86 % vs. 58.4 %; χ2 = 5.58, p = 0.02); in MTS the difference
is 10.65 percentage points (49.35 % vs. 60 %; χ2 = 2.19, p = 0.14).
Result 5 Allowing responders to remain ignorant about the consequences of their decision on
third parties does not significantly affect selfishness.
Result 6 About two-thirds of subjects reveal information on the consequences of their actions
on third parties.
3.2 Individual heterogeneity
Table 2 shows the results of a logistic regression including all observations. Model 1
includes the treatments as explanatory variables and a dummy variable that equals
one for subjects revealing the payoff information in the Strategic ignorance condition.
Controlling for those who actively revealed the information, Strategic ignorance leads to
a significant increase in selfish behavior. Unsurprisingly, subjects who remain ignorant
predominantly choose the offer that maximizes their payoff.
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Model 2 adds several socio-demographic variables from the post-experimental ques-
tionnaire. Overall the coefficients and standard errors of the treatments remain fairly
stable. Regarding employment status, those self-employed and those not working, but
looking for a job are significantly less selfish than those employed (reference group).
Regarding education, those holding an associate degree are significantly less selfish
than those holding a bachelor’s degree (reference group). Ethnicity, age, and gender all
have no significant effect on selfishness. We also asked subjects about their position on
the political spectrum on a nine-item scale ranging from 1 (left-wing) to 9 (right-wing).
Each unit increase on the scale significantly decreases the likelihood of a selfish choice
by about 6 %. That is, going from one to nine on the scale, increases the likelihood
of a selfish choice by almost 56 %. Furthermore, we asked subjects a few questions
regarding their income situation (see verbatim questions and response scale below
Table 2). Subjects who reported that the COVID-19 pandemic improved their financial
situation are significantly less likely to choose selfishly.
As mentioned in the description of our experimental design, we randomized both
the color and screen position of the two offers. While the latter had no effect, subjects
were about 23 % less likely to choose the selfish offer when it was visually highlighted
by the color blue.
Table 2 — Logistic regression
Model 1 Model 2
Odds ratio se Odds ratio se
Experimental conditions
Baseline Reference group Reference group
Bystander 1.473 0.375 1.529 0.403
Replacement 1.522* 0.389 1.534 0.404
Compound 1.574* 0.402 1.580* 0.416
Deontological 2.698*** 0.722 2.429*** 0.669
CompoundMTO 1.473 0.375 1.412 0.371
BaselineMTO 0.938 0.237 0.866 0.227
CompoundMTO* 4.695*** 1.737 4.800*** 1.834
Compound* 6.275*** 2.318 6.370*** 2.433
Decisions
Revealed Payments 0.162*** 0.054 0.149*** 0.051
continued
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Table 2 — continued
Model 1 Model 2
Odds ratio se Odds ratio se
Employment status
Working (paid employee) Reference group
Working (self-employed) 0.577*** 0.111
Not working (temporary layoff) 1.174 0.530
Not working (looking for work) 0.628** 0.147
Not working (retired) 0.684 0.330
Not working (disabled) 2.079 1.363
Not working (other) 0.925 0.223
Prefer not to answer 0.933 0.522
Education
Less than high school degree 0.406 0.509
High school graduate 0.805 0.225
Some college but no degree 0.896 0.162
Associate degree in college 0.669* 0.156
Bachelor’s degree in college Reference group
Master’s degree 0.793 0.142
Doctoral degree 0.711 0.388
Professional degree (JD, MD) 0.884 0.387
Ethnicity
African american 1.216 0.408
American indian 0.741 0.397
Asian 1.741 0.604
Hispanic 0.778 0.266




Prefer not to answer 0.271* 0.203
Other socio-demographics
Age 0.990 0.007
Political spectrum 1.057* 0.032
Income
Relative Income 1.021 0.066
Effect COVID-19 (current) 0.847* 0.083
Effect COVID-19 (until end 2021) 1.104 0.117
continued
results 91
Table 2 — continued
Model 1 Model 2
Odds ratio se Odds ratio se
Other controls
Deal B is blue 0.774** 0.099
Deal B is left 0.917 0.119
N 1125 1125
LR χ2(8) 59.61 105.66
p-value 0.00 0.00
Pseudo-R2 0.04 0.07
Note. Table reports results of a logistic regression. Dependent variable is a binary variable that equals 1
if a responder chose the fair offer, 0 otherwise. Independent variables: Education (“What is the highest
level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received?”; Employment status
(“Which statement best describes your current employment status?”); Ethnicity (“Choose one or more
ethnicities that you consider yourself to be:”); Political spectrum (“ Where would you classify your-
self on the left/right political spectrum?”), response scale ranges from 1 (left-wing) to 9 (right-wing);
Relative Income (“How do you think your income and financial situation currently compare to those
of others in the U.S. who are of similar age?”), response options are Don’t know/No answer, Much
below average, Somewhat below average, About the average, Somewhat above average, Much above
average; Effect COVID-19 (current, “How did the COVID-19 pandemic affect your financial situation?”,
response options are Worsened a lot, Worsened, Remained unchanged, Improved, Improved a lot; Effect
COVID-19 (until end 2021, “How do you expect the COVID-19 pandemic will affect your financial situ-
ation until the end of 2021?”), response options are Worsen a lot, Worsen, Remain unchanged, Improve,
Improve a lot — * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
3.3 Behavioral intentions
In the post-experiment questionnaire, we asked subjects to indicate on a scale from
1 (“not at all important”) to 7 (“very important”), how important a number of given
reasons were for their decision.
Table 4 shows the means of the seven reasons for the full sample and for the
different combinations of α and β. It also reports the results of a Kruskal-Wallis
equality-of-populations rank test for each item by experimental condition. Looking
at the full sample, punishment of the unfair proposer was the least important reason
(1.96). Most important was the maximization of one’s own payoff (4.95) and the impact
on the second round (4.41). For all items but punishment of the unfair proposer
and deontological reasoning, a Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test by
experimental condition (i.e. combinations of α and β) is significant. Overall, the
order of means for the experimental conditions is consistent with expectations. For
example, subjects in α = 0 report the lowest importance of the reasons “Reduce
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inequality”, “Reduce externality” and “Impact on second round”. In contrast, subjects
in α = 1 report the highest importance of the reasons “Reduce inequality” and “Reduce
externality”.
Besides differences between experimental conditions, the items can also be used
to compare motives between subjects that chose the selfish versus the unselfish offer.
One way to make this comparison is to identify for each subject the reason that was
attributed the greatest (least) importance and to determine the relative frequencies
depending on choice.10 Reducing payout inequality (30.23 %) and the externality
(28.75 %) were most frequently valued as the most important reason by unselfish
subjects. Punishing (33.5 %) or rewarding (28.96 %) the unfair proposer were regarded
as least important most frequently. The most and the least important reason most
frequently chosen by selfish subjects were the maximization of one’s own payoff
(61.04 %) and the impact on the second round (17.33 %) compared to punishment of
the proposer of the selfish offer (33.28 %) and deontological reasoning (24.69 %). See
Tables 10–12 in Appendix A.3 for more information.
Table 3 shows the means for the items depending on the choice in round one. A
Mann-Whitney test is significant for all reasons, but “Impact on second round”. This
reason, of course, should be equally important regardless of whether someone is
driven by material self-interest or concern for the third party. The difference for all
other items is in the expected direction. Subjects choosing the unselfish offer are driven
relatively strongly by the intention to (i) reduce payoff inequality (5.79 vs. 2.64), (ii)
reduce the externality (5.74 vs. 2.43), (iii) “not get their hands dirty” (4.43 vs. 2.09), and
(iv) punish the unfair proposer (2.39 vs. 1.65). In contrast, they are relatively weakly
driven by the intention to maximize their own payoff (3.18 vs. 6.23) and reward the
unfair proposer (2.47 vs. 4.11).
4 Discussion and conclusion
This paper examines how selfish behavior is affected by uncertainty about ex-ante
causal responsibility for a negative externality suffered by third parties. Using moves
of nature, we investigate the role of pivotality, the bystander and replacement excuse,
and the scope of uncertainty.
10If subjects gave equal importance to more than one reason, ties were randomly broken.
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Table 3 — Behavioral intentions by choice
Choice
Selfish Unselfish Mann-Whitney test
Behavioral intention Mean Mean z p-value
Reduce inequality 5.79 2.64 22.18 0.00
Punish unfair proposer 2.39 1.65 6.96 0.00
Reduce externality 5.74 2.43 22.69 0.00
Impact on second round 4.45 4.37 0.75 0.45
Deontological reasoning 4.43 2.09 17.99 0.00
Maximize own payoff 3.18 6.23 −22.83 0.00
Reward unfair proposer 2.47 4.11 −12.37 0.00
Note. Wording of question: For each of the following reasons, please indicate how important it was
for your decision to accept Deal [A/B] by Proposer [1/2] in Round 1; Item 1: “Reduce the inequality
of payments between participants.”; Item 2: “Punish Proposer [A/B] for choosing a deal associated
with a loss for Third Party [1/2]”; Item 3: “Reduce or eliminate the loss for the third parties.”; Item
4: “Increase the probability of an ‘Only [A/B]’ scenario in Round 2.”; Item 5: “Not ‘get my hands
dirty’ by accepting an offer that reduced the payment of a third party.’”; Item 6: “Maximize my own
payoff.”; Item 7: “Reward Proposer [A/B] for an offer that was financially advantageous for me.”;
All questions were answered on a 7-point Likert-type scale, where 1 is “not important at all” and 7 is
“very important.”
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We find that, once uncertainty is introduced, selfish behavior increased by about
one-fourth. Interestingly, neither the degree of being pivotal, nor which specific
excuse can be applied, nor the scope of uncertainty seem to affect this result. This
inelasticity to changes in risk can be seen as an indication that people employ self-
serving interpretations of risk and can thus be interpreted as excuse-driven behavior
(Haisley and Weber 2010; Exley 2015). The only other study that directly compares the
bystander and replacement excuse also finds no significant difference between the two
(Brütt et al. 2020). Regarding pivotality, our results stand in contrast to Falk et al. (2020),
who find that perceived diffusion of being pivotal in group decisions is significantly
correlated with selfish behavior. Differences in the decision context between their and
our their study may explain these results. Ex-ante pivotality in groups is ambiguous
and depends on subjective beliefs about the behavior of other group members. A belief
of high pivotality thus corresponds to the belief that a relatively large share of group
members votes against the externality. That is, perceptions of ex-ante pivotality reflect
the perceived social norm and level of morality in the group. Beliefs about pivotality
thus “carry” social information. In contrast, in our experiment, uncertainty, and hence
pivotality, is the result of moves of nature. Thus, our results indicate that depending on
how strongly perceptions of pivotality are imbued with social information, behavior
may vary.
We find that behavior is inelastic to changes in uncertainty. However, once subjects
have no impact on the externality, selfishness increases significantly. Nevertheless,
28 % of subjects forgo payoff and thus seem to follow deontological moral reasoning.
The results of other studies also suggest deontological reasoning (Casal et al. 2019;
Falk et al. 2020), but the precise numbers are probably context-specific and therefore
difficult to compare. Falk et al. (2020) e.g. find that about 18 % of subjects who believe
that they are not pivotal at all in a simultaneous group decision forgo payoff by voting
against the externality. One implication of our finding of a significant increase in
selfishness at a pivotality of zero is that policies or factors that make consumers feel
that they have at least some influence on market outcomes may lead to a reduction
in selfish behavior. In markets, perceptions of consumer pivotality may arise simply
due to observation of changes in supply. In addition, advances in information and
communication technologies allow consumers to coordinate more easily and may
increase perceptions of pivotality. In a similar vein, Brütt et al. (2020) find that subjects
have a strong tendency to self-select into group decision-making if they can guarantee
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a pro-social outcome. This indicates that individuals seek decision environments that
reduce uncertainty and in which they feel that their decision has an impact.
In our Strategic ignorance condition, two-thirds of subjects do not use the opportunity
to remain ignorant about the consequences of their actions on third parties. Overall,
there is no significant effect of Strategic ignorance on selfish behavior. This is in contrast
to findings in previous literature. One explanation could be that subjects in our
experiment had no information about the possible direction of influence on third
parties. The high percentage of information disclosure may thus be explained by
ambiguity. In studies finding widespread strategic ignorance, like Dana et al. (2007),
Bartling et al. (2014), and Grossman and Weele (2016), subjects know the potential
consequences for third parties; only which action leads to which outcome is hidden
information. Thus, for decisions where individuals have no prior information or
expectations about the potential impact of their actions on others, strategic ignorance
may not be that prevalent. From a policy perspective, our result implies that a large
fraction of consumers are interested in the consequences of their actions for others
and that information disclosure policies that allow easy access to information at the
time of purchase (Weil et al. 2006),e.g. standards and labels, can have a considerable
impact on consumer behavior.
We see a couple of interesting avenues for future research. First, in this study, we
examined comparatively large changes in pivotality from one hundred percent down
to fifty, ten, and zero percent. Consistent with excuse-driven behavior, our results
indicate an inverse S-shaped relationship between pivotality and selfish behavior. A
more fine-grained examination of this relationship may further support this finding
and could ultimately reveal differences between the replacement and bystander excuse,
as well as a combination of the two. Second, changing the scope of uncertainty had no
influence in our experimental setup. However, we only considered one variation in
scope. This finding could also be explored in a more fine-grained study. Third, the
role of social information for the perception of ex-ante causal responsibility represents
an interesting area of research. How decision-makers perceive social cues may depend
on the decision environment, such as the (shared) identity with other individuals or
the importance of moves by nature compared to human decisions. Moreover, belief
formation and susceptibility to social information may be correlated with personality
traits. Fourth, the high proportion of information disclosure in our experiment
underscores the dependence of strategic ignorance on the experimental setup and
specifically on the information that decision-makers have about the possible outcomes
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for others. Future research could examine how strategic ignorance changes with
different prior information about others’ outcomes, including uncertainty or vague
cues about the direction of influence. Rarely do people know the exact outcomes for
others.
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Table 5 — Education
What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest
degree you have received?
N %
Less than high school degree 3 0.27
High school graduate (high school diploma or equivalent including
GED)
70 6.22
Some college but no degree 221 19.64
Associate degree in college (2-year) 104 9.24
Bachelor’s degree in college (4-year) 474 42.13
Master’s degree 212 18.84
Doctoral degree 16 1.42
Professional degree (JD, MD) 25 2.22
Table 6 — Employment status
Which statement best describes your current employment status? N %
Working (paid employee) 668 59.38
Working (self-employed) 177 15.73
Not working (temporary layoff from a job) 26 2.31
Not working (looking for work) 104 9.24
Not working (retired) 23 2.04
Not working (disabled) 12 1.07
Not working (other) 97 8.62
Prefer not to answer 18 1.60
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Table 7 — Ethnicity
Choose one or more ethnicities that you consider yourself to be: N %
African American 86 7.64
American Indian 16 1.42
Asian 109 9.69
Hispanic 58 5.16
White Caucasian 918 81.60
Other 13 1.16
Table 8 — Political spectrum
Where would you classify yourself on the left/right political spectrum? N %








9 - right-wing 27 2.40
Table 9 — Relative income
How do you think your income and financial situation currently com-
pare to those of others in the U.S. who are of similar age?
N %
Don’t know/No answer 25 2.22
Much below average 181 16.09
Somewhat below average 266 23.64
About the average 355 31.56
Somewhat above average 267 23.73
Much above average 31 2.76
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Figure 4 — Age of participants
Note. Subjects were asked about their year of birth. To approximate age, we assumed
that subjects who participated in December 2020 already had a birthday. For subjects who
participated between January and February 2021, we assumed the opposite.
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A.2 Data quality checks
Quality of answers to an open-ended question
As a test of the quality of our data, we asked subjects to explain their decision using
an open-ended question in the post-experimental questionnaire. Overall, the data
quality for this question is quite good, both linguistically and in terms of scope. The
vast majority of participants gave comprehensible reasons for their decisions, which
demonstrated their understanding of the experiment and payoff scheme. There were
no copied texts or meaningless combinations of strings. Less than 5 percent gave
answers that were inconsistent with their choices in the experiment or that showed
a misunderstanding of the experiment. On average, subjects wrote 18 words (with
a maximum of 151) or 94 characters (with a maximum of 820). Subject that chose
the unselfish offer wrote significantly more (104.81 vs. 86.13 characters; t-stat = 3.71,
p-value< 0.00).
Sensitivity to changes in incentives
To test the validity of our experimental set-up and subjects’ understanding of the
instructions and experiment, we tested subjects’ sensitivity to changes in incentives
under full pivotality in MTS. We ran an additional study with three variations of
payoffs for the third party associated with the selfish offer: 70 Coins (as in the
main study), 40 Coins, and 10 Coins. We collected 50 observations per treatment.
We preregistered this study at https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=xr7e79. The
proportion of selfish decisions is 56, 38, 28 percent for the third-party payoffs of 70, 40,
10. Pearson χ2 = 8.34 with p = 0.015.
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A.3 Behavioral intentions
Table 10 — Percentage of selfish subjects reporting reason as most important
Behavioral intention %
Maximize own payoff6 61.81
Impact on second round4 15.18




Punish unfair proposer2 0.61
Note. Ties were randomly broken; Wording of question: For each of the following reasons, please
indicate how important it was for your decision to accept Deal [A/B] by Proposer [1/2] in Round
1; 1: “Reduce the inequality of payments between participants.”; 2: “Punish Proposer [A/B] for
choosing a deal associated with a loss for Third Party [1/2]”; 3: “Reduce or eliminate the loss for the
third parties.”; 4: “Increase the probability of an ‘Only [A/B]’ scenario in Round 2.”; 5: “Not ‘get my
hands dirty’ by accepting an offer that reduced the payment of a third party.’”; 6: “Maximize my
own payoff.”; 7: “Reward Proposer [A/B] for an offer that was financially advantageous for me.”;
All questions were answered on a 7-point Likert-type scale, where 1 is “not important at all” and 7 is
“very important.”
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Table 11 — Percentage of selfish subjects reporting reason as least important
Behavioral intention %




Impact on second round4 7.36
Reward unfair proposer7 6.60
Maximize own payoff6 0.92
Note. Ties were randomly broken; Wording of question: For each of the following reasons, please
indicate how important it was for your decision to accept Deal [A/B] by Proposer [1/2] in Round
1; 1: “Reduce the inequality of payments between participants.”; 2: “Punish Proposer [A/B] for
choosing a deal associated with a loss for Third Party [1/2]”; 3: “Reduce or eliminate the loss for the
third parties.”; 4: “Increase the probability of an ‘Only [A/B]’ scenario in Round 2.”; 5: “Not ‘get my
hands dirty’ by accepting an offer that reduced the payment of a third party.’”; 6: “Maximize my
own payoff.”; 7: “Reward Proposer [A/B] for an offer that was financially advantageous for me.”;
All questions were answered on a 7-point Likert-type scale, where 1 is “not important at all” and 7 is
“very important.”




Impact on second round4 13.53
Deontological reasoning5 11.63
Maximize own payoff6 8.46
Punish unfair proposer2 2.96
Reward unfair proposer7 1.69
Note. Ties were randomly broken; Wording of question: For each of the following reasons, please
indicate how important it was for your decision to accept Deal [A/B] by Proposer [1/2] in Round
1; 1: “Reduce the inequality of payments between participants.”; 2: “Punish Proposer [A/B] for
choosing a deal associated with a loss for Third Party [1/2]”; 3: “Reduce or eliminate the loss for the
third parties.”; 4: “Increase the probability of an ‘Only [A/B]’ scenario in Round 2.”; 5: “Not ‘get my
hands dirty’ by accepting an offer that reduced the payment of a third party.’”; 6: “Maximize my
own payoff.”; 7: “Reward Proposer [A/B] for an offer that was financially advantageous for me.”;
All questions were answered on a 7-point Likert-type scale, where 1 is “not important at all” and 7 is
“very important.”
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Table 13 — Percentage of unselfish subjects reporting reason as least important
Behavioral intention %
Punish unfair proposer2 34.46
Reward unfair proposer7 27.27
Maximize own payoff6 14.59




Note. Ties were randomly broken; Wording of question: For each of the following reasons, please
indicate how important it was for your decision to accept Deal [A/B] by Proposer [1/2] in Round
1; 1: “Reduce the inequality of payments between participants.”; 2: “Punish Proposer [A/B] for
choosing a deal associated with a loss for Third Party [1/2]”; 3: “Reduce or eliminate the loss for the
third parties.”; 4: “Increase the probability of an ‘Only [A/B]’ scenario in Round 2.”; 5: “Not ‘get my
hands dirty’ by accepting an offer that reduced the payment of a third party.’”; 6: “Maximize my
own payoff.”; 7: “Reward Proposer [A/B] for an offer that was financially advantageous for me.”;
All questions were answered on a 7-point Likert-type scale, where 1 is “not important at all” and 7 is
“very important.”
108 excusing selfish behavior with (willfully induced) uncertainty
A.4 Experimental instructions
Text
Group composition and role assignment
After you have read the instructions and answered the comprehension questions
correctly, you will be matched into groups of five participants.
All participants in your group will be assigned to one of three different roles. In each
group, there are
• two proposers (P1 and P2),
• two third parties (TP1 and TP2) and
• one responder (R).
Each third party is randomly assigned to one proposer. To indicate this assignment, we
will denote the two pairs as “Third Party 1, Proposer 1” and “Third Party 2, Proposer
2”. The figure below illustrates the group composition.
The group composition and role assignment remain unchanged throughout the exper-
iment.
The task
This task lasts for two rounds. In each round, each participant initially receives 100
coins.
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The final earnings of all participants per round may differ from this initial endowment
and depend on the decisions of the two proposers and the responder. Third parties
cannot make decisions.
Each round comprises two consecutive steps:
• Step 1: Both proposers offer a deal to the responder.
• Step 2: The responder decides which of the two offered deals he/she wants to
accept.
Deals are always beneficial for proposers and the responder, but they can also affect
the earnings of third parties. The earnings of a third party are [MTO: only affected
by a deal if it is accepted by the responder; MTS: affected by a deal as soon as it is
offered by a proposer. Therefore, irrespective of the responder’s choice, the earnings
of third parties are determined by the deals offered by the proposers.]
The following illustration shows the two consecutive steps of the deal-making process
and at which step payment consequences occur for each participant. As an example,
the illustration assumes that the responder accepts the deal offered by Proposer 1.
[MTO: Figure 5; MTS: Figure 6]
The two deals
Proposers and responder can make two types of deals: Deal A and Deal B. The table
below shows the payment consequences of the deals and the resulting earnings per
round, taking into account the initial endowment of 100 coins. [Strategic ignorance: As
you can see from the table, the third parties’ values are not visible.
After the comprehension questions but before any decisions are made, each participant
has the opportunity to reveal the payment consequences of the two deals for the third
party. A participant’s decision whether to reveal or not is not shared with other
participants.]
[Full information: Table 14; Strategic ignorance: Table 15]
Earnings per round
Proposers: The proposer of the accepted deal receives 110 coins (+10 coins). The
proposer of the rejected deal, keeps the initial endowment of 100 coins (±0 coins).
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Third parties: Third party earnings are [MTO: only affected by a deal if it is accepted
by the responder. If a responder accepts Deal A, the assigned third party receives
[Full information: 70 coins (-30 coins); Strategic ignorance: ??? coins (??? coins)]. If a
responder accepts Deal B, the assigned third party receives [Full information: 100 coins
(±0 coins); Strategic ignorance: ??? coins (??? coins)]. The third party assigned to the
rejected deal remains unaffected and keeps the initial endowment of 100 coins (±0
coins); MTS: affected by a deal as soon as it is offered by a proposer and therefore they
do not depend on the responder’s choice. If a proposer offers Deal A, the assigned
third party receives [Full information: 70 coins (-30 coins); Strategic ignorance: ???
coins (??? coins)]. If a proposer offers Deal B, the assigned third party receives [Full
information: 100 coins (±0 coins); Strategic ignorance: ??? coins (??? coins)].]
Responder: If the responder accepts Deal A, he/she receives 120 coins (+20 coins). If
the responder accepts Deal B, he/she receives 110 coins (+10 coins).
Offers in Round 2
While deals offered in Round 1 are deliberately chosen by proposers, the deals offered
in Round 2 are determined for the proposers by a computerized urn draw. The
computerized urn draw can lead to one of two possible scenarios:
• Only A: Both proposers offer Deal A
• Only B: Both proposers offer Deal B
Composition of the urn and the responder’s influence on the offers in Round 2
The urn is filled with 20 balls. Each ball is labeled with either A or B and has the same
chance of being drawn. If an A ball is randomly drawn, Round 2 will be the Only A
scenario. If a B ball is randomly drawn, Round 2 will be the Only B scenario.
The following illustration shows the composition of the urn depending on the re-
sponder’s choice in Round 1. In addition, the probabilities for both scenarios are
shown.
[Figure 7 for α = 0.1 and β = 0.5 as an example]
If the responder chooses Deal A in Round 1, Round 2 will be either an Only A scenario
with a probability of 55 percent or an Only B scenario with a probability of 45 percent.
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If the responder chooses Deal B in Round 1, Round 2 will be either an Only A scenario
with a probability of 45 percent or an Only B scenario with a probability of 55 percent.
Tables and figures
Table 14 — Tabular representation of the payoffs associated with the deals in Full
information






Proposer +10 coins 110 coins +10 coins 110 coins
Third Party -30 coins 70 coins ±0 coins 100 coins
Responder +20 coins 120 coins +10 coins 110 coins
Table 15 — Tabular representation of the payoffs associated with the deals in Strategic
ignorance






Proposer +10 coins 110 coins +10 coins 110 coins
Third Party ??? coins ??? coins ??? coins ??? coins
Responder +20 coins 120 coins +10 coins 110 coins
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Figure 5 — Graphical representation of the steps in MTO
Figure 6 — Graphical representation of the steps in MTS
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Figure 7 — Graphical representation of the urn drawing for α = 0.1 and β = 0.1
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A.5 Comprehension questions
Table 16 — Comprehension questions
Question Type
At which step of the deal-making process do third parties
bear the payment consequences of a deal?
• Third parties bear no payment consequences at all.
• At step 1, as soon as a proposer offers a deal.




The deals offered in Round 1 are . . .
• deliberately chosen by proposers
• determined by a computerized urn drawing




Imagine that in Round 1 Proposer 1 offers Deal A and
Proposer 2 offers Deal B. The responder accepts Deal B by




• Third Party 1
• Proposer 2
• Third Party 2
Dropdown question;
List of answers
ranges from 0 to 150




Table 16 — continued
Question Type
Imagine an Only A scenario, where a responder accepts the
deal offered by Proposer 1. How many Coins do the third
parties earn in that round?a
• Third Party 1
• Third Party 2
Dropdown question;
List of answers
ranges from 0 to 150
Coins in 10 Coin
increments and “???”
Imagine an Only B scenario, where a responder accepts the
deal offered by Proposer 1. How many Coins do the third
parties earn in that round?a
• Third Party 1
• Third Party 2
Dropdown question;
List of answers
ranges from 0 to 150
Coins in 10 Coin
increments and “???”
Which scenario, i.e. which combination of deals is possible
in Round 2?b
• Deal A and Deal B: One proposer offers Deal A and
the other proposer offers Deal B
• Only A: Both proposers offer Deal A
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Table 16 — continued
Question Type
If the responder chooses Deal A in Round 1, what it the






If the responder chooses Deal B in Round 1, what it the






Note. For some questions, we provided an additional hint, which was shown directly below the
question in italics: a“Please take into account the initial endowment of 100 Coins, i.e. if a participant
gains 10 Coins as a result of a deal, choose ‘110’. Remember that Third Party 1 is assigned to Pro-
poser 1 and Third Party 2 is assigned to Proposer 2. [Strategic ignorance: If a payment is unknown,
please choose the option ’???’.]”, b“Remember that the deals offered by the proposers in Round 2 are
determined by a computerized urn drawing.” ,c“Please enter the probability in percent. Remember
that the deals offered by the proposers in Round 2 are determined by a computerized urn drawing.”
chapter iv
Dishonest online: A distinction between
observable and unobservable lying
Daniel Hermann, and Mattheus Brenig
This paper investigates dishonesty in an online experiment. A distinction is made
between lies that are observable to the experimenter and those that are not. Participants
are asked whether (1) a randomly generated number between 0 and 9 and (2) their
mother’s birth year is even or odd; only the answer “even” is associated with a payoff.
Responses of “even” are significantly more frequent when lying is unobservable. The
order of these two questions significantly affects only the frequency of observable
lying.
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1 Introduction
In many decisions, lying can result in an economic advantage for the dishonest person.
Examples range from dishonesty by entire industries such as the emission control
defeat device in the automotive sector, to individual lies such as tax evasion. Due to
technological advances, economic interactions are increasingly characterized by (1)
reduced physical interaction and (2) a greater number of potential trading partners;
as opposed to repeated face-to-face interactions. This could reduce reputational and
social identity concerns that otherwise constrain lying. More recently, the ongoing
digitization of economic transactions has been catalyzed by the COVID-19 pandemic.
While there is interest in dishonesty and lying in the economic literature, few
studies investigate such behavior online (Gerlach et al. 2019; Gomes et al. 2021). This
study presents the results of an experiment conducted on the crowdsourcing platform
“MTurk” that tests for differences between observable and unobservable lying in an
online setting. Due to the absence of a physically present experimenter, social identity
concerns of observable lying could be reduced. In addition, due to the flexibility
and short-term nature of work arrangements in online labor markets (see Dube et
al. 2020), reputational concerns may also be reduced. Thus, in contrast to findings
from laboratory experiments (see Gneezy et al. 2018; Abeler et al. 2019; Crede and
Bieberstein 2020), the observability of lying may not matter in online settings.
This study adds four contributions to the literature: First, lying that is observable and
unobservable to the experimenter in an online experiment is investigated. Second, an
order effect for these two treatments is tested. In the literature, there is no comparison
of order effects for observed and unobserved lying, while there are some indications
that lying increases (slightly) in repeated one-shot decisions (Kocher et al. 2018; Ben-
Ner and Hu 2021). Third, compared to previous studies (Gneezy et al. 2018; Abeler
et al. 2019; Crede and Bieberstein 2020), the experimental procedure of measuring
observed and unobserved lying is held constant, allowing for a true ceteris paribus
comparison.1 Finally, this study contributes to a small body of literature on lying in
an online setting (Schild et al. 2020) and moves beyond the usual student sample.
1In Gneezy et al. (2018), participants either had to draw an object from an envelope (unobserved) or
tick a box on a computer (observed). In Abeler et al. (2019), payments were either handed out by
the experimenter (observed) or taken by participants (unobserved). In Crede and Bieberstein (2020),
a die was rolled either physically (observed) or digitally (unobserved).
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2 Experimental design and procedure
A simple experimental design is implemented in which participants are asked whether
a number is odd or even (Heinicke et al. 2019). Thus, there are only two possible
answers, of which only one is true. To provide an economic incentive for dishonesty,
each answer of “even” is incentivized with $0.5.2 An answer of “odd” leads to no
payment. Participants are asked for two different numbers specifying the treatments:
Observable: The last digit of a randomly generated completion code. Participants have
to enter the completion code at the end of the experiment and are therefore aware that
it is observable to the experimenters.
Unobservable: The year of birth of the participant’s mother. This is participants’
private information. There is no question regarding the birth year of the mother or
any other relatives within the experiment.
Each participant is asked both questions on separate pages in random order.3 To avoid
strategic answers, we did not mention to participants ex-ante that they had to answer
two incentivized questions.
The experiment was conducted online from November 2020 to February 2021 using
the software oTree (Chen et al. 2016) via Amazon Mechanical Turk.4 The design and
hypotheses of this study are preregistered just like another part of the experiment,
not dealing with research questions on honesty. This study was only available to US
residents. A total of 1,130 participants completed the experiment and are considered
for this study.5 To describe our sample, some characteristics are illustrated in Table 1,
Appendix A.1.
3 Results
To compare observable and unobservable lying, we use only the first randomly
assigned question per participant. Therefore, we restrict our analysis to a between-
2Throughout the study, we used the term “Coins” for our experimental currency, with a conversion
rate of 100Coins/$1.
3For the verbatim questions see Appendix A.3.
4For a discussion of running experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk please refer to Paolacci et al.
(2010).
5For more detailed information on the experimental procedure see Appendix A.2.
120 dishonest online: a distinction between observable and unobservable lying
subjects comparison and neglect within-subjects data that might be affected by order
effects (which will be analyzed later).
In the unobservable treatment, the share of even answers has to be compared to an
underlying uniform distribution.6 In contrast, the percentage of participants lying
about the observable completion code can be exactly quantified. Participants with an
even completion code, which was the case for 52.73 %, had no incentive to lie.7 A total
of 268 participants were assigned an odd completion code, of which 107 or 39.93 %
untruthfully reported “even”, while 60.07 % of answers were honest.
Result 1 If lying is observable, 39.93 % of participants lie.
When asked as the first question (n = 563), 82.24 % of participants report an even
maternal birth year. A binomial-probability-test of the observed proportion against
the expectation (50 %) reveals a significant (p < 0.001) deviation.
Result 2 If lying is unobservable, 82.24 % of responses are “even”, which is significantly
different from the expected relative frequency.
Since even and odd numbers are equally likely in both the unobservable and
observable treatment, a simple test for treatment differences is to directly compare
the proportion of even responses. A binomial-probability-test reveals a significant
difference (p < 0.001) between these two relative frequencies (82.24 % vs. 71.60 %). A
more accurate test takes into account the actual frequency of even numbers (52.73 %)
in observable. More specifically, the assumed frequency of true “even” responses
(50 %) has to be added to the observed frequency of dishonest “even” responses
(39.93 %× 0.5). Since an even completion code was randomly generated in a little more
than half of the cases, the “naive” test slightly underestimates the actual difference
between treatments (82.24 % vs. 69.97 %).
Result 3 Lying is more frequent in unobserved than in observed.
Thus far, we have only compared answers to the first question. We now include the
responses to the second question to investigate order effects. There may be order effects
6We do not correct for the marginal change of the uniform distribution through leap years. However,
we tested for it and results do not differ.
7In the whole sample, there are four participants who state “odd”, while the last number was even.
All four participants had 0 as last number. We assume that these participants are not sure whether
0 is odd or even, and therefore treat these observations as if the number was odd and therefore
answered honestly.
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that are specific to the degree of observability of a lie or simply because lying changes
over repeated tasks. Figure 1 shows the relative frequency of “even” in unobserved and





























































Figure 1 — Proportion of “even” (lying) in unobserved (observed) by order
of “even” responses for maternal birth year by order (chi2-test; p = 0.772). In contrast,
there is an order effect for the question regarding the completion code. A statistical
comparison of the share of lies—39.93 % if observed is the first question and 21.30 % if
observed is the second question—reveals a significant difference (chi2-test; p < 0.001).
Result 4 No order effect for the proportion of “even” responses in unobserved.
Result 5 Lying in observed depends on the order, with more lying if the question is asked
first.
Another finding is that almost every participant who lies in observed reports an even
number in unobserved, regardless of the order: 97.20 % and 98.31 % when observed is
asked first and second, respectively. The proportion of “even” responses in unobserved
is significantly (Fisher’s-Exact-Test; p < 0.001) higher for liars in observed (97.59 %)
compared to those honest in observed (79.98 %). Similarly, almost all participants
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who report an odd maternal birth year report their completion code truthfully. The
proportion of liars is significantly (Fisher’s-Exact-Test; p < 0.001) lower for participants
who report odd in unobserved (4.49 %) compared to those who report even (35.53 %).
Although there is a significant difference between females and males for both
observable and unobservable lying, the main results also hold for both genders.8
Overall, males lie significantly more often then females in observable (35.71 % vs.
24.71 %; chi2-test, p = 0.006). The gender difference is less pronounced in unobservable
(84.78 % vs. 80.36 %; chi2-test, p = 0.051), and a binomial-probability-test affirms that
both genders lie significantly more in unobservable (p < 0.001 for both genders). The
main results for the order effect also replicate for both genders: there is no order
effect in unobservable, and observable lying is significantly reduced when asked second.
Interestingly, males lie significantly more then females when observable is asked first
(50.37 % vs. 30.23 %; chi2-test, p = 0.001), but not second (22.07 % vs. 19.23 %; chi2-test,
p = 0.562). Thus, the order effect is more pronounced for males.
4 Conclusion and Discussion
Online economic interaction leads to reduced physical and personal interaction and
therefore might reduce reputational and social identity concerns for observable lies.
The results of this study, however, contradict the expectation that the observability of
a lie has no influence on the tendency to lie in an online setting. A lower proportion
of dishonesty can be found in observable compared to unobservable lying. Thus,
reputational concerns or the fear of negative consequences in any way matter in online
experiments.
Furthermore, based on the observable (dis)honesty of the participants and assuming
an even distribution of odd and even maternal birth years, three groups can be defined:
(1) 31.20 %9 of participants are always honest; (2) 28.99 %10 are always dishonest, while
8Ten participants who “Prefer not to answer” the question about their gender are excluded from the
following analysis.
969.54 % of participants with an odd completion code report truthfully. Of those, 22.43 % report an
odd maternal birth year. Assuming a uniform distribution of odd and even birth years, 22.43 of 50,
or 44.86 % tell the truth. Consequently, 69.54 % × 44.86 % = 31.20 % are honest under both degrees
of observability.
1030.46 % of participants with an odd completion code report untruthfully. Of those, 2.41 % report an
odd maternal birth year. Assuming a uniform distribution of odd and even birth years, only 2.41 of
50, i.e. 4.82 % tell the truth. Hence, 30.46 % × (100 − 4.82)% = 29.2 % always lie.
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for; (3) 39.81 % behavior depends on whether a lie is observable or not.11 Thus, for the
first two groups, our manipulation of observability did not change behavior, but for
the third group it did. From previous studies, there is evidence that participants lie
even though their behavior can be observed (see e.g. Kocher et al. 2018), suggesting
that there may be individuals who lie under both conditions. However, comparisons
of observable and unobservable dishonesty have previously been conducted between
subjects. Thus, it has not been possible to actually identify groups of participants who
lie in only one or both conditions in previous studies.
Another finding is that an order effect can only be found for observable dishonesty.
Economically, this could be explained by higher (psychological) costs of observable
compared to unobservable dishonesty and a negative marginal utility of earnings.
If someone has already earned money through the first question (due to honest or
dishonest response), the psychological cost of an observable lie to the second question
may outweigh the lower marginal benefit of additional earnings. In contrast, the
psychological costs of an unobservable lie may be comparatively small and always
outweighed by its benefits. Another explanation could be that the order of the two
questions produces a salience/contrast effect leading to varying perceived costs: the
observability of a lie is more salient due to the unobservability of truthfulness of
responses to the first question. Since our results indicate a pronounced order effect,
future studies may want to investigate the causes of this result. Finally, our results
do not support a relevant extent of (moral) restitution cleansing (see West and Zhong
2015) due to a second truthful answer. Such behavior would imply an order effect for
the unobservable treatment as well.
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Table 1 — Socio-demogprahics
Variable Mean SD N
Female in % 49.55a — 1120b
Age in years 36.80c 10.90 1130
Income compared to others in the USd 2.73 1.09 1104e
Note. a For comparison the average age in the U.S. is 38.4 years (United States Census Bureau, 2019);
b Ten participants choose the option “Prefer not to answer”; c Subjects were asked about their year of
birth. To approximate age, we subtracted the response from the year of data collection; For compari-
son the percentage of females in the U.S. is 50.8% (United States Census Bureau, 2019); d Response to
the question: “How do you think your income and financial situation currently compare to those of
others in the U.S. who are of similar age?” on a 5-point-Likert-scale: 1 = Much below average; 2 =
Somewhat below average; 3 = About the average; 4 = Somewhat below average; 5 = Much above
average; e Twenty six participants choose the option “Don’t know/no answer”.
A.2 Experimental procedure
This experiment was part of the post-experimental questionnaire of an otherwise unre-
lated experiment. We prevented retakes and restricted participation to US residents. In
addition, due to readability issues, we excluded participants who reported accessing
the study via a smartphone or tablet. After reading a plain language statement and
giving consent to participate, subjects read the instructions for the (unrelated) main
task. Subjects had a maximum of two attempts to answer a few comprehension ques-
tions. Subjects who failed twice were excluded from participation. After completion
of the main task and as part of the questionnaire, two questions relevant to this study
were presented on separate web-pages in a randomized order.
Participants that finished the questionnaire received a fixed payment of $1 in
addition to the earnings based on their decisions in the main task and the two honesty
questions. Participants earned an average of $3.05 or $/h13.30.
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A.3 Verbatim questions
The following question is about a specific number. Your task is to report whether the
answer to the question is odd or even. Your answer determines your payoff for this
task. You receive a payment of
• 50 Coins, if you report “even” and
• 0 Coins, if you report “odd”.
[observable: This is your completion code for this HIT: [Completion code]. Don’t
worry, you don’t have to remember your completion code. It will be displayed again
on the last page of this HIT. Is the last number of your completion code odd or even?]
[unobservable: Please think of the birth year of your mother. Is the last number of
this year odd or even?]
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Can Gamification lead to
Increased Paid Crowdworkers’ Output?
Sascha Lichtenberg, Tim-Benjamin Lembcke, Mattheus Brenig,
Alfred Benedikt Brendel, and Simon Trang
Gamifying serious work environments, such as paid crowdsourcing platforms, po-
tentially increases crowdworkers’ task motivation, engagement and enjoyment. This,
in turn, can lead to a higher willingness to contribute, higher quality of work and
long-term engagement. However, it remains unclear how crowdworkers behave when
gamification is applied to motivate them to do more tasks than being paid for. In this
study, we conducted an experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk to investigate this
relationship in a controlled setting that allows us to isolate the effects of gamification.
Using 320 crowdworkers, we examine the effect of different gamification affordances
(progressbar, badges and leaderboard) on autonomous motivation and task performed.
We find that some gamification affordances (namely badges and leaderboard) can lead
crowdworkers to do more work than they are paid for. However, this is not necessarily
associated with autonomous motivation, as we did not consistently observe an increase
in autonomous motivation along with more tasks performed.
S. Lichtenberg et al. (2020). “Can Gamification lead to Increase Paid Crowdworkers
Output?” In: WI2020 Zentrale Tracks. GITO Verlag, pp. 1188–1202.
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Breathing life into consumer rights: Smartphone tools
facilitating the “right to know” on substances of very
high concern in REACH articles
Julian Schenten, Mattheus Brenig, Martin Führ, and Kilian Bizer
Background
The EU chemicals regulation “Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction
of Chemicals” (REACH) aims to reduce usage of substances of very high concern
(SVHCs) by firms. Therefore, a consumer right-to-know about SVHCs in articles
is intended to create market-based incentives. However, awareness of the right-to-
know among EU citizens is low. Moreover, the response window of 45 days afforded
to suppliers impedes immediate, informed decisions by consumers. Consequently,
despite being in effect for more than 10 years, only few consumer send requests. Civil
society actors have developed smartphone applications reducing information search
costs, allowing users to send right-to-know requests upon scanning an article’s barcode.
Answers are stored in a database and made available to the public immediately. This
paper assesses to which extent smartphone tools contribute to increased use of the
right-to-know by undertaking a case study of the application “ToxFox” by the German
non-profit organisation Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland (BUND).
Results
An analysis of the data from the BUND database for the period 2016 to 2018 reveals
that about 20 thousand users have sent almost 49 thousand requests. This has let to
more than 9 thousand database entries, including 189 articles which contain SVHCs
above the legal threshold. The data also indicate that receiving information on
requested articles encourages further use of the application. Many suppliers accept the
application and pro-actively provide information on articles without SVHCs. However,
most consumers use the application only for a short time, and suppliers are struggling
to reply to right-to-know requests.
Conclusion
Evaluating the results, the study identifies options to enhance the application’s design
in terms of user motivation and legal certainty, and to enhance the framework govern-
ing barcode assignments to articles with a view to better contributing to transparency.
As for policy implications, a lack of consumer requests can in part be traced back to
design flaws of the right-to-know and a lack of implementation and enforcement of
REACH. In addition, suppliers have to increase their supply chain communication
efforts to make sure they are in the position to properly answer consumer requests.
We recommend several policy options addressing these and additional aspects, thus
contributing to the legislative review of Art. 33 REACH.
J. Schenten et al. (2020). “Breathing life into consumer rights: smartphone tools
facilitating the “right to know”on substances of very high concern in REACH articles”.
In: Environmental Sciences Europe 32.1, p. 114.
chapter vii
Refining tools to bridge the gap between academia and
chemical regulation: perspectives for WikiREACH
Marlene Ågerstrand, Mattheus Brenig, Martin Führ, and Julian Schenten
Regulatory hazard and risk assessments of chemical substances have to include all
reliable and relevant data to be credible and complete. However, screening the
literature for appropriate studies and extracting data is burdensome. Therefore,
reducing impediments by making data easily and readily accessible to risk assessors
could result in more comprehensive hazard and risk assessments. In this paper, we
study WikiPharma, a database that aggregates ecotoxicity data for pharmaceuticals,
extracted from peer-reviewed studies. The use of the WikiPharma database is explored
to develop strategies on how similar tools can bridge between science and policy by
providing risk assessors with easily accessible summary data. Specifically, adapting the
concept of WikiPharma to industrial chemicals regulated under the REACH regulation
is discussed. Experiences with WikiPharma show that there is interest in using peer-
reviewed studies in regulatory decision-making. However, tools like WikiPharma
require constant updates. Hence, as for “WikiREACH”, effective incentives are needed
to motivate researchers to feed in relevant data for regulatory assessments. Besides,
support by automated processes can aid in the labour-intensive activity of gathering
data. To ensure that such a tool is continuously maintained and compatible with the
regulatory system, and thereby useful for hazard and risk assessments of chemicals, it
would benefit from being developed in collaboration with the major stakeholders in
the field, i.e. regulatory agencies, academia, industry, scientific journals, and providers
of research network platforms.
M. Ågerstrand et al. (2017). “Refining tools to bridge the gap between academia and
chemical regulation: perspectives for WikiREACH”. in: Environ. Sci.: Processes &
Impacts 19, pp. 1466–1473.
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